Contemporary history experiences of Kallie de Beer: Stories of my grandpa and- mother about the Anglo Boer War. The family link to the diamond related and seventh adventist church de Beers. Farms in the Free State's little towns and trips abroad. Research in contemporary history of South African diplomacy and the change of the former South African Army into a peacekeeping force in Africa and additional academic research in casu open distance e-learning.

Sunday, January 18, 2015

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

IS THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE FIT FOR PURPOSE RE: PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT? By Pierre de Montfort and Kallie de Beer ABSTRACT Conflicts in Africa could generally be characterized as a difference of ideologies, factional disputes and civil wars. It is a condition of bellum omnia contra omnes—a constant war of everything against everything. As the holy Bible describes the end times; it is a part of the conflict between the Civitas Dei and the Civitas Terrenna (the city of God against the city of the Devil) all over the world that culminates more in under developed states where political literacy is very low or do not exist. Subsequently the United Nations is striving to secure peace in such countries, also in Africa. Since 1999, South Africa, as a first world country, is also involved in peace support operations (PSO). However, the South African National De-fence Force (SANDF) that derived from one of the best defence forces in the world, namely the former South African Defence Force (SADF), seems to backslide in such operations and is in serious need of retraining, especially in peacekeeping instruction. Both the National In-stitute for Higher Education, Northern Cape (NIHE) and the Central University of Technol-ogy, Free State (CUT) prepared the United Nations Institute for Training and Research Peacekeeping Operations Correspondence Instruction courses (UNITAR POCI) for accredita-tion at the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA). Our research attempts to deter-mine whether the Republic of South Africa (RSA) should urgently review its PSO. The re-search covers the period 1994 to 2009. Our realisation is that the SANDF is overstretched and may not be able to maintain PSO in the long run. The SANDF’s contribution to the African Standby Force (ASF) to fulfil the African Union’s (AU) peacekeeping ambitions will depend heavily on a holistic civic education for its future citizens and peacekeepers and a fixed stra-tegic budget. Finally, peacekeeping is about the protection of women and children who al-ways suffer the consequences of conflicts. A philosophical introduction: War on itself cannot be justified. It is a self declared right. Therefore peacekeepers cannot intervene, but have to obey the principles of International Law, namely: “It is the duty of those who have no part in the war to do nothing which may favour the party having an unjust cause, or which may hinder the action of one waging a just war and, in case of doubt, to treat both belligerents alike, in permitting transit, in furnishing provisions to the troops, in refrain-ing from assisting the besieged”. On itself, quotations like this is a contra dictio in terminus , because philosophers such as Hugo Grotius may have supported a theory on the doctrine of a just war (Van Glahn 1972: 625), but crimes against humanity are still horrifying. In such case, International Law can be expanded to protect the rights of civilians (Cf. Van Glahn 1972 : 707). International jurists take a dim view of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law) because it still poses a crime against peace. Mother Theresa also said: “Do not protest against war, but protest for peace” (De Beer et al. 2008). Women and children are usually the innocent people who suffer the dire consequences of con-flict situations. South Africans were seriously confronted with this peril during the Anglo Boer War when tens of thousands of women and children, both Black and White, lost their lives in the British concentration camps as part of England’s war policy of a scourged earth. That was to burn down the houses and kill all the cattle that may be used by the Boers. Black concentration camps behind Brandfort were only recently renovated where former President Thabo Mbeki unveiled a new monument in remembrance of those who lost their lives (Women’s Memorial and Anglo Boer War Museum 2001). Keeping the suffering of innocent women and children in mind elsewhere on the continent, the SANDF is obliged to assist other organisations like churches and humanitarian groups. However,without getting involved with the hot wars of Africa. A new and softer approach is necessary to fulfil this delicate task with better trained and equipped for purpose peacekeepers. From a Christian perspective, government authority has been ordained by God (Roeping en Riglyne 2009: Nederlandse Geloofsbelydenis). The Westminster Confession inter alia states that God is the Higher Authority and Ruler over the whole earth. Under this Higher Authority, Governments are equipped with the power of the sword to protect and defend the rights of its citizens (Romans 13: 1-4; 1 Peter 2:13, 14). The Scottish Confession of 1560, article 24, states that kings and authorities are part of God’s plan for man to rule in the interest of the wellbeing of mankind and to secure peace (Raath 2009: 6-7). War and peace is a matter be-tween life and death and as in the case in South Africa where so much has already been said about the abandoning of the death sentence, one should realise that is not a easy yes or no to get involved in African conflicts or not. Some jurists argue that the death penalty must be re-instated because it also serves as a deterrent to curb the thinking of unlawful citizens. Those who say that it should not be re-instated are reasoning from a total Humanistic point of view, irrespective of how the religious groups feel about it. More or less the same arguments for and against military intervention and peacekeeping could be compared with the legal rights of citizens to defend themselves with a legal fire arm. The debate goes on whether the South African Police Service could use their weapons when their life is threatened by criminals. Likewise peacekeepers who are protecting civilians are being fired at. Subsequently they have to defend themselves to protect the innocent and neutral parties without starting a fully fledged conflict with the specific fighting factions. Peacekeeping, in the absence of a well structured democratic government, consequently ad-heres to this precious ordainment of God. In Judaism, one of the sayings of the Old Testa-ment is “to bend your swords into plow shares” (Isaiah 2:4). This quotation also appears on the statue for peace at the United Nations headquarters in New York. Peacekeeping is also about arbitration. Islamic citizens are protected by the “Tahkim”, the Arabic word for arbitra-tion which is recognised by Islamic law (Ladapo 2008: 111). It is associated with conflict resolution in disputes among parties according to the prescriptions of the Koran. Even the most majestic prince of peace, Jesus Christ, declared: “Blessed are the peacemak-ers, because they will be called children of God” (Mathew 5:9). Peacekeeping forces around the world do not only assist to secure peace among battling factions, they also assist in nature disasters, e.g. the Haiti earth quake, floods and other so called “acts of God”. In all events where fellow human beings suffer either from famine, civil wars or natural disasters, people instinctively want to help other people irrespective of creed, nationality or race. It is the civilised and godly character of mankind. Subsequently to South Africa’s involvement in peacekeeping support operations (PSO) in Africa, the South African icon for peace and reconciliation, Nelson Mandela (1993), put forward the national value, “South Africa cannot escape its African destiny”. In the former South Africa government, the South Africa Defence Force (SADF) executed fully fledged war operations against communist inspired factions on- as well as deep across our borders. It was both a defensive as well as an offensive force. After the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was established, it became a “peace orientated” force, i.e. to train peacekeeping militia and to participate in the peacekeeping support operations (PSO) of the United Nations (UN) in African countries who are suffering under civil wars and poor socio economic conditions. As in the case of the former conventional war on and beyond the borders, the debate went on about South Africa’s involvement in African disputes, even in PSO on the continent. In the former political dispensation the question whether war is justified by the Holy Bible or not, humanitarian bodies and some religious doctrines differed immensely about this topic. Some of the main Afrikaans church leaders held the idea of Romans 13, as previously quoted, while militia were fond to quote the following sayings of former American presi-dents: "All that's necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to do noth-ing" (Benjamin Franklin); "No man who refuses to bear arms in defense of his nation can give a sound reason why he should be allowed to live in a free country" (Terry Roosevelt"); and “The democracy will cease to exist when you take away from those who are willing to work and give to those who are not" (Thomas Jefferson). Some of he most likely ones of South African strategists were: “He, who wants peace, must prepare for war si vis pacem parabellum (Barnard 1978). Pacifists on the other side of the coin launched the anti conscription campaign to re-volt against the former SA Government’s national recruitment policy to enlist young men from their sixteenth year for military training (Cf. SA Media 2010: Max Du Preez in By). Under current circumstances, soldiers join the SANDF out of their free will and for extra remuneration for PSO. Many of them want to resign as soon as they are back in the RSA because of the traumatic witnesses of human strife, famine, cross fire experiences and the harsh climatic conditions. There are now other ques-tions raised whether South Africa should get further involved in PSO on the continent or not, such as the low success rates to secure peace versus the great financial bur-dens of PSO. Contemporary facts: The RSA is regarded by some experts as an economic powerhouse in Africa. With the advent of democracy in 1994, the international community expected that it would participate in PSO. Therefore the SANDF has, since 1999, been involved in various peace missions. Al-though, there is stringent criticism from various quarters such as opposition political parties about the SANDF’s involvement, these deployments are relating to the foreign policy of the current government. In light of the many “bread and butter” issues that this young democ-racy faces in a variety of spheres, should armed forces continue to support operations on the African continent? Does the SANDF have the capability to sustain PSO over the long term, and in doing so, will the SANDF be able to build a legacy of success? Given the dire states of affairs to maintain law and order in the country itself such as the killing of innocent farmers (Cf. Plague in remembrance of more than 2000 names of farmers at the NAMPO show grounds, Bothaville), criminal statistics which are some of the highest in the world which includes murder and the deteriorating situation of the influx of foreigners over the borders. These are the hard facts that have to be weighed against the sending of soldiers to far away to African conflicts while they could perform the similar duties in their own country. Rumours are that the South African government is going to reduce PSO else-where in Africa and to deploy more soldiers on the border with the Kingdom of Lesotho from where cattle and motor vehicle thieves as well as drug dealers (dagga) operate into the RSA. Although it may be a good sign for the anti PSO debate, it immediately raises the question whether these new soldiers are academically trained for their task even in South Africa it-self? And if not so, what is the government going to do about the situation? Increasing conflict scenarios The security of the African continent, including South Africa, has deteriorated since 1989, when the Cold War ended. Kruys, (2004:35) draws attention to fact that reduced foreign in-terest, a change in the nature of the conflicts and dictatorial rule in many states contributed to this decline, also in the adjacent Zimbabwe and Lesotho, next to the RSA. Kritzinger (2005:5) mentions other factors such as: poverty, underdevelopment, scarcity of and com-petition for resources, refugees and illegal immigrants, illegal firearms, diseases such as HIV/AIDS, cholera, and malaria, corruption in government, abuse of power, mismanage-ment, ethnic conflict and religious intolerance. The majority of African conflicts is unconventional, and may be described as intra-state or ethno-political involving irregular forces, with light weapons and guerrilla tactics. They are not merely two opposing forces, but include rival warlords, factional leaders, Para-military forces, private security companies, even organised criminal groups and states that involve themselves militarily in their neighbour’s affairs. Moreover, consent may be absent, since authority has collapsed and is meaningless because of a large number of groups claiming power. Agreements, international law and conventions are openly disobeyed. Duvenhage (1998) defines the crisis of such nation states as the absence of a political culture where knowledge is not imparted. Subsequently the citizenry must be edu-cated in political literacy; however, SANDF soldiers should also be trained to be peacekeepers and to act as diplomats in uniform elsewhere on the continent as well as for local deployment. SANDF deployments on the African continent: By 2008, the SANDF had in the order of 3,000 troops deployed on various UN/AU peace-keeping missions: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Cote d’ Ivoire and Sudan. Another 1,500 troops are deployed domestically, primarily to assist the South African Police Service (SAPS) in fighting crime. The government also approved additional SANDF deploy-ments to UN/AU missions in Uganda, Eritrea/Ethiopia and Nepal (IRIN, 2008:1). The most significant AU operation that the SANDF has been part off thus far is the African Mission to Burundi (AMIB); however the South Africa government decided to withdraw from this region for obvious reasons that are spelled out in this research paper (Cf. SA Media 2009). In Sudan the conflict has a decidedly ethnic character involving an Arabic north against a black south reinforced by an Islamic-Christian religious divide. Against better judgement the SANDF got involved so far north involving Arabic Africa. According to Kruys (2004:36) this is unfortunate because ethnic conflicts which have escalated to the level of semi-conventional battles with tanks and artillery require more force to end, than the RSA can afford. Connolly (2007) says it needs understanding how to differentiate between the arrays of Africa’s ethnic cultures. Ethnicity “etnos” according to its Greek concept entails more than race. It inter alia means to have dominion over a specific life sphere. Political scientists differentiate several life spheres to define a democratic society which the SANDF PSO forces obviously do not always respect. In the conflict in the DRC, SANDF forces have been involved since 1999. Despite the signing of several peace accords, and the presence of the world’s largest United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force, MONUC, with over 18,000 troops in the theatre, the violence continues. An UN-brokered ceasefire signed in January 2008 has been consistently violated by both the Congolese army and the ethnic Tutsi rebels. The FDLR, extremist Hutu militia made up of former Rwandan genocidaires, also remain at large in the eastern DRC. Is the SANDF fit for purpose? Back in 1994, it looked as if the future role of the SANDF was to be a ‘self-defence’ force, restricted to the defence of home territory. The Constitution of the RSA, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), states that the primary object of the SANDF is to defend and protect the country. The first and primary role of the SANDF is defence against external aggression and it is for this core function that it is funded, structured, trained, and equipped. However it is for its sec-ondary functions, such as PSO, that the SANDF is most operational. Today, in striking contrast, the SANDF finds itself operating far from home (average of 3 500 km), in the DRC, Burundi and the Darfur region of Sudan. Although not combat operations, peacekeeping far from home imposes many of the same demands, in terms of logistics, medical support, command and control (Campbell, 2007:1). Peacekeeping, is thus, not op-erations without the risk of combat, and can change from a peacekeeping effort to one of peace enforcement overnight. However, one could raise the question: “Does the SANDF have the right means for what has now become its main operational duty?” An index pub-lished in the International Security Review was of the opinion that South Africa’s military potency is slipping (Trench, 1998:15). In 1998 the SANDF sent troops into Lesotho on an operation, code named Operation Boleas, to prevent a military coup after an election dispute. The poorly managed operation raised doubts internationally about South Africa’s military competence. Jankielsohn (2003:21), a member of parliament, urged government to acknowledge that the SANDF does not have the ability to sustain troop deployments in PSO over long periods, lacking the logistical ca-pacity to do so. According to Boshoff (2004:25) SANDF resources is stretched to the limit by its peacekeeping obligations, prompting a review of policy. Heitman (2003:12), remarks on training, saying that an army lives and dies literally by its training. Therefore, soldiers, units and formations must train frequently, regularly and thor-oughly for an army to be effective. One cannot deploy troops and just leave them. They have to come back for training. The SANDF’s present rotation of six months in 24 is not sus-tainable – it may destroy the training programme, and leave the force ill-prepared for con-ventional and PSO alike. Heitman (2005b:1) articulates that for the better part of a decade the SANDF has not been able to train properly, to maintain its equipment properly, or to maintain its infrastructure. And then the most important need is healthy and fit militia for PSO. However, the re-nowned journal, Accord (2007:42) contends that HIV/AIDS constitute the biggest threat to its deployment potential and operational effectiveness – up to 25% of SANDF employees are thought to be HIV-positive. Consequently, the challenge faced in terms of mission-ready bat-talions is ‘fitness’. Health issues have had a considerable impact on the force. As a result, battalions have had to be constituted of personnel from different units to reach required force strength. Often these newly formed battalions do not have sufficient time to train to-gether before deployment on peace missions, weakening their ability to function as an inte-grated force. The SANDF also has a cultural problem in the sense that its forces on deployment have so far exhibited an extremely poor disciplinary record. The behavior of South African troops, espe-cially off duty in both Burundi and the DRC, has been a problem to the RSA and has given the force a bad reputation (Mandrup 2008, 1-35). Obviously South African soldiers should be re-trained as “diplomats” under the blue caps of the UN peace core (De Beer et al 2008). The RSA’s defence budget has consistently been reduced and is projected to fall from a pre-vious 4.4 percent to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2009. An additional financial issue is that when the UN reimburses South Africa for peacekeeping missions, the funds go to the Ministry of Finance and are not necessarily paid over to the SANDF for its expenditures (IRIN, 2008:1). It is thus debatable to what extent the RSA should be involved in PSO. The country has large-scale unemployment, widespread poverty, poor border control, soaring inflation, high food prices, and a high crime rate as major problems. Helfrich (2008:1) observe other areas of concern in the SANDF: figures disclosed in the defence annual report indicate that the de-fence force has a vacancy rate of 15%, but a vacancy as high as 40% in key areas. There is a 30% shortage of combat-ready soldiers. The report noted that 6 700 people left the SANDF in 2007/08, with 1660 having departed from critical occupations. SAAF is losing pilots and technical specialists while the SAN is losing sailors, divers, subma-riners and navy engineers, leaving for higher wages. The SA Army is losing intelligence per-sonnel, air defence artillery and artillery specialists. The policy of affirmative action has im-pacted on this situation, as it leads to juniors being appointed in positions way above their ceiling. The exodus of skilled staff, leave only a handful of experienced personnel to guide and mentor the rest who have limited or no combat experience. The misalignment between Defence Policy and resource allocation, and the increasing requirements to provide military capabilities for peace and humanitarian missions placed on the Department of Defence (DOD), has necessitated the updating of the White Paper on Defence (1996) and the Defence Review (1998) to review policy. Still the problem prevails, namely the absence of proper academic- as well as international peacekeeping training standards. Research observations: Although more funding, equipment and military training in PSO are necessary, the most prominent one remains the human factor i.e. the peacekeeper in uniform, especially when he or she forms part of an international organization such as The United Nations or the Red Cross. Our observation is that our peacekeepers fall short of this important requirement. According to our view, PSO staff should be aware of political literacy concepts in governance, conflict resolution and social justice to forestall the diplomatic blunders, sex scandals, lack of understanding of International Law and civil misbehavior of the past. UN-structures already promote peacekeeping and enhance social development via higher education institutions (HEIS) in Africa to educate co-operative communities with Open and Distance E-learning (ODEL) to understand, appreciate and sustain a just and fair civil society (Cf. De Beer et al 2009). Unfortunately, co-operation cannot be taken for granted in communities in conflict (Cf. SA Media 2008). One of the problems is the misinterpretation of a true democratic government. Another issue is “whether traditional African societies are in essence community orientated and if so, what place the individual has in such a collectivist perspective”? ( Higgs 2007). Normative forms of governments in Africa are considerably virulent. In analysing hu-man rights, and freedom of speech within a differentiated civilised social order, state philosophical- and constitutional approaches of political scientists are generally to test whether the relation structures, community structures and social figurants are in tact within the differentiated powers of the trias politica. That implies the differen-tiation of powers of the state into law giving, administration and judicial functions. Transgression of the aforementioned sub-variant authoritarian boundaries (or the Rule of Law) creates a qwasi democracy and de facto governments in many African states. According to Connoly (2007) most conflicts on the African continent are caused by “ethnostress”. Researchers recognise that specific “hurting” behaviours are associ-ated with feelings of fear and anger. When people suffer mental confusion, physical and emotional pain, it causes feelings of hopelessness (Antone and Hill 1992). Therefore, academe, teachers and the SANDF should be co-responsible for educat-ing people about ethics. Morality is learned within families, communities, schools, as-sociations and public organisations. Lenn (2002) says these “are the crucibles in which individuals make choices, where they take cues from others about what is right and wrong, good and bad, appropriate and inappropriate”. Courses, such as UNITAR POCI, could assist to transform communities in conflict into communities of social justice. Antone and Hill. (1992) inter alia prioritise the so called “frozen needs”: • to feel secure, safe and at peace; • to know that their existence is beneficial; and • to love, live and let live. It is unimaginable that victims of perpetual conflict could develop their full human po-tential; neither exercises their democratic rights, nor experiences the international principles of the UN Declaration of Human Rights. What then are the means to educate both laymen and the official peacekeeper? As stated earlier, peacekeeping modules could be integrated with civil education in pri-mary and secondary schools while programmes for Higher Education Institution ses-sions could be extended into community education such as Adult Basic Education (ABE). Communities could become aware of international goodwill instead of distrust-ing foreign military staff under the UN flag. Ignorance often hampers settlements. The idea is to establish a ‘needs driven modality’ with military intelligence to sustain a peaceful society throughout the process. Co-operative or work integrated learning for South African militia is based on a phi-losophy of learning that promotes experiential learning based on the co-operation between HEI’s, industry, commerce and the public sector ( SASCE 2004). Types of Co-op inter alia lend itself for peacekeeping instruction, e.g.: • Work-Integrated Learning (WIL) / army, police, intelligence agencies; • Experiential Learning / students in strategic studies; • Work-based Learning / correctional services; • Internship / diplomatic corps ; • Learner ships / HEIS; • Research Collaboration / ex militia; • Staff Development / navy, air force; • Exchange Programs / co-op learners; • Partnerships / government departments / security companies; • Community Outreach / Adult Basic Education; and • Life Long Learning / peacekeepers in post-conflict zones. • Service learning could be specifically applied to: • engender civic responsibility in peacekeeping; • develop peacekeeping skills and awareness of personal, social, cultural val-ues and respect; and • engage in peacekeeping activities where both the community and the militia are primary beneficiaries. Recommendations: In conclusion it is easy to be an arm chair critic about our military role in Africa without thinking about all the “what if scenarios such as natural disasters such as in Haiti and else-where in the world or even the deteriorating safety situation of Southern Africa with regards to the killing of farmers, cross border theft, HIV and Aids, famine, pollution of scarce water resources, droughts, political illiteracy, religious and racial conflicts and many other factors that are unknown to us. Strives for war and peace, as the great writer Tolstoy pondered about, will be with mankind until the end of times, i.e. the Armageddon.(Revelation 16:16) Subse-quently, mankind will always endeavour to secure itself for survival. It is both a physical war as well as a spiritual warfare that determines the character of the situation. With this under-standing the citizenry as well as the PSO corps have to be academically educated with politi-cal literacy or civil education programmes that are integrated with their later careers either as peacekeepers, diplomats, police, correctional services, teachers, lecturers, doctors, religious leaders, politicians and community leaders. It has to be a holistic effort and not with a one sided military view. It therefore stands to reason that the South African government has to draw up a strategic budget very urgently to cover both the national as well as its continental PSO obligations to train and equip peacekeepers as well as its citizenry with sufficient civic life skills. Ex President Nelson Mandela (1993) put forward the national value, “South Africa cannot escape its African destiny”. The answer to this is a reserved “yes”, but an operational pause is desperately needed to review the total approach to PSO. List of References: ACCORD. 2007. 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