HOULD THE RSA CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN AFRICA?

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CENTRAL UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, FREE STATE

SHOULD THE RSA CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN AFRICA?

By Dr PJ de Montfort* and Dr KJ de Beer*

Abstract

South Africa is involved in peace support operations (PSO) in Africa since 1999. This paper attempts to determine whether the RSA should continue to participate in PSO. The research was informed by a variety of sources covering the period 1994 to 2009. The nature of conflict in Africa is outlined followed by the view of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) government on the deployment of its armed forces in support of peace keeping . A summary of some of the current operations that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is involved in, is followed by a discussion on capabilities and the ability of the SANDF to sustain PSO over long periods. Our realisation is that the SANDF is overstretched and may not be able to maintain PSO in the long run. However, there is an understanding that the RSA will have to continue deploying in regional operations if it wants to maintain a strategic role. The SANDF’s contribution to the African Standby Force (ASF) to fulfil the African Union’s (AU) peacekeeping ambitions will depend heavily on the RSA as an economic powerhouse on the continent. However, if the SANDF wants to play a leading role, a strategic budget should be prioritised.

**Colonel (Dr.) Pierre Juan de Montfort of the SANDF submitted his doctoral dissertation on Peacekeeping Support Operations under Dr. KJ de Beer as promoter at the Cental University of Technology, Free State.

BACKGROUND

The RSA is regarded by some experts as an economic powerhouse in Africa. With the advent of democracy in 1994, the international community expected that it would participate in PSO. Therefore the SANDF has, since 1999, been involved in various peace missions. Although, there is stringent criticism from various quarters such as opposition political parties about the SANDF’s involvement, these deployments are relating to the foreign policy of the current government. In light of the many “bread and butter” issues that this young democracy faces in a variety of spheres, should armed forces continue to support operations on the African continent? Does the SANDF have the capability to sustain PSO over the long term, and in doing so, will the SANDF be able to build a legacy of success?

SCOPE

Our research deals inter alia with:

• the nature of conflict;
• the foreign policy of the RSA;
• the scope of PSO;
• the capacity of the SANDF to sustain PSO; and
• whether the SANDF should continue with PSO, or not ?

The nature of conflict in Africa

The security of Africa has deteriorated since 1989, when the Cold War ended. Kruys, (2004:35) draws attention to fact that reduced foreign interest, a change in the nature of African conflicts and dictatorial rule in many African states contributed to this decline. Kritzinger (2005:5) mentions other factors such as: poverty, underdevelopment, scarcity of and competition for resources, refugees and illegal immigrants, illegal firearms, diseases such as HIV/AIDS, cholera, and malaria, corruption in government, abuse of power, mismanagement, ethnic conflict and religious intolerance.

The majority of African wars is unconventional, and may be described as intra-state or ethno-political involving irregular forces, with light weapons and guerrilla tactics. There are not merely two opposing forces, but include rival warlords, factional leaders, para-military forces, private security companies, even organised criminal groups and states that involve themselves militarily in their neighbour’s affairs. Moreover, consent may be absent, since authority has collapsed and is meaningless because of a large number of groups claiming power. Agreements, international law and conventions are openly disobeyed. The constraints of PSO such as in Somalia and Rwanda, led to unwillingness by the major powers to send their own soldiers on UN peacekeeping efforts. (Neethling, 1999: 22).

This state of affairs led to calls made by ex President Thabo Mbeki for an Africa-renaissance that amounts to Africans accepting responsibility for their own destiny (Steyn, 1997:12) and accountability for conflict prevention and resolution on the continent through co-operation at regional and sub-regional level (Thiart, 1997:12). The African Union (AU) proposed the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF) and the G8 countries have pledged assistance to African peacekeeping efforts as part of their Africa action plan to support NEPAD (Fabricius, 2003:11).

Since June 2009, Africa hosts 10 military PSO’s. Six of these are United Nations (UN) missions – in Cote d’ivoire (UNOCI), CHAD/Central African Republic (CAR) (MINUCRAT), Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Liberia (UNMIL), Sudan (UNMIS) and Western Sahara (MINURSO). One mission is a hybrid UN-African Union (AU) operation in Darfur, Sudan (UNAMID). The other three missions are the AU operations in Somalia (AMISOM), the Economic Community Central African States (CEMAC) operation in CAR (MICOPAX) and the Special Task Force in Burundi, run by South Africa. These operations involve over 73 000 uniformed peacekeepers and represent 70% of UN deployments worldwide (Williams, 2009:3).

The view of South Africa on peacekeeping in Africa

The White Paper on Defence (1996:20), the Defence Review (1998:36) and the White Paper on participation in international peacekeeping operations (1998:2) acknowledge the expectation for the RSA to become involved. According to Cilliers and Malan (1996:343) “South Africa cannot prosper in a sea of African insecurity and instability… thus for South Africa peacekeeping in Africa – may be considered as action in direct support of its own security and economic interests.” In an interview with Helmoed-Römer Heitman, the Chief of the South African (SA) Army, Lt Gen Solly Shoke, reiterated that it was the SANDF’s duty to participate in conflict peacekeeping in Africa (Heitman, 2005a:34).

SANDF deployments in support of conflict peacekeeping in Africa

By 2008, the SANDF had in the order of 3,000 troops deployed on various UN/AU peacekeeping missions: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Cote d’ Ivoire and Sudan. Another 1,500 troops are deployed domestically, primarily to assist the South African Police Service (SAPS) in fighting crime. The government also approved additional SANDF deployments to UN/AU missions in Uganda, Eritrea/Ethiopia and Nepal (IRIN, 2008:1).

The most significant AU operation that the SANDF has been part off thus far is the African Mission to Burundi (AMIB). In 2001, the SANDF was sent to the ethnically divided nation to protect opposition politicians during the peace process. AMIB is a largely successful operation for the AU, though disorder in the DRC creates challenges for Burundi. Now 10 years. In 2009, the SANDF has begun withdrawing its forces from Burundi, in spite of an uneasy peace in the region.

The conflict in Sudan consists basically of an insurgency on the part of the non-Islamic south, against an Islamic-based central government in Khartoum.. This war has a decidedly ethnic character involving an Arabic north against a black south reinforced by an Islamic-Christian religious divide. Against better judgement the SANDF got involved so far north involving Arabic Africa. According to Kruys (2004:36) this is unfortunate because ethnic conflicts which have escalated to the level of semi-conventional battles with tanks and artillery require more force to end, than the RSA can afford.

In the conflict in the DRC, SANDF forces have been involved since 1999. Despite the signing of several peace accords, and the presence of the world’s largest United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force, MONUC, with over 18,000 troops in the theatre, the violence continues. An UN-brokered ceasefire signed in January 2008 has been consistently violated by both the Congolese army and the ethnic Tutsi rebels. The FDLR, extremist Hutu militia made up of former Rwandan genocidaires, also remain at large in the eastern DRC.

How equipped is the SANDF to deal with conflict peacekeeping in Africa?

Back in 1994, it looked as if the future role of the SANDF was to be a ‘self-defence’ force, restricted to the defence of home territory. The Constitution of the RSA, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), states that the primary object of the SANDF is to defend and protect the country. The first and primary role of the SANDF is defence against external aggression and it is for this core function that it is funded, structured, trained, and equipped. However it is for its secondary functions, such as PSO, that the SANDF is most operational.

Today, in striking contrast, the SANDF finds itself operating far from home (average of 3 500 km), in the DRC, Burundi and the Darfur region of Sudan. Although not combat operations, peacekeeping far from home imposes many of the same demands, in terms of logistics, medical support, command and control (Campbell, 2007:1). Peacekeeping, is thus, not operations without the risk of combat, and can change from a peacekeeping effort to one of peace enforcement overnight. However, one could raise the question: “Does the SANDF have the right means for what has now become its main operational duty?” An index published in the International Security Review was of the opinion that South Africa’s military potency is slipping (Trench, 1998:15).

In 1998 the SANDF sent troops into Lesotho on an operation, code named Operation Boleas, to prevent a military coup after an election dispute. The poorly managed operation raised doubts internationally about South Africa’s military competence. Jankielsohn (2003:21), a member of parliament, urged government to acknowledge that the SANDF does not have the ability to sustain troop deployments in PSO over long periods, lacking the logistical capacity to do so. According to Boshoff (2004:25) SANDF resources is stretched to the limit by its peacekeeping obligations, prompting a review of policy.

Heitman (2003:12), remarks on training, saying that an army lives and dies literally by its training. Therefore, soldiers, units and formations must train frequently, regularly and thoroughly for an army to be effective. One cannot deploy troops and just leave them. They have to come back for training. The SANDF’s present rotation of six months in 24 is not sustainable – it may destroy the training programme, and leave the force ill-prepared for conventional and PSO alike. Heitman (2005b:1) articulates that for the better part of a decade the SANDF has not been able to train properly, to maintain its equipment properly, or to maintain its infrastructure.

Campbell (2007:1) points to some of the particular challenges that the SANDF face:

• It now has to prepare for operations in unfamiliar environments ( for example, no experience of jungle or mountain warfare);
• The Army’s current Infantry Fighting Vehicle (ICV), the Ratel and Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) the Casspir, remains vulnerable to man-portable anti armour weapons (such vulnerabilities are serious because peacekeeping forces generally allow the other side to fire first and only then return fire);
• The SA Air Force (SAAF) does not have enough strategic lift capability. (Heitman (2003:1) agrees that the SAAF does not have enough strategic lift capability for the rapid deployment of a credible force, to sustain it, and, should it become necessary to quickly extract it);
• The SAAF has so few fighter aircraft that its ability to deploy a credible minimum number for a sustained basis in support of operations far away from the RSA is doubtful;
• The shortage of attack helicopters is even worse, with currently only 12 “Rooivalk” in service (the SAAF does not have large transport helicopters such as the American Chinook);
• The cancellation of the contract for eight Airbus A400M military freight aircraft on Nov 5, 2009 (Anon, 2009:1), the government may have to realign its foreign policy goals;
• The SA Navy (SAN) does not have sufficient sealift capability to deploy the equipment of a credible force in one operation. In spite of the delivery of the new corvettes it does not have a sufficient number of combat vessels to sustain operations in coastal areas such as off the coast of Somalia to help stem piracy (the SAN does have the equipment to undertake blockade operations in low-intensity environments, question is, is it sustainable over long periods?); and
• The SAN’s ability to patrol inshore has deteriorated (it needs to replace its existing strike craft fleet (Wikipedia, 2009:1).

Accord (2007:42) contends that HIV/AIDS constitute the biggest threat to its deployment potential and operational effectiveness – up to 25% of SANDF employees are thought to be HIV-positive. Consequently, the challenge faced in terms of mission-ready battalions is ‘fitness’. Health issues have had a considerable impact on the force. As a result, battalions have had to be constituted of personnel from different units to reach required force strength. Often these newly formed battalions do not have sufficient time to train together before deployment on peace missions, weakening their ability to function as an integrated force.

Logistical weaknesses, amongst others, are that the SANDF’s war reserves are at depleted levels and stock level planning of operational reserves including medical logistical support are lacking. The vehicles and equipment of most combat units show signs of ageing and is at a low serviceability status (Kruys, 2004:37). This view is shared by Mandrup (2008:1-35) who says that a serious backlog of equipment maintenance is a stumbling block. The experience of MONUC shows that several UN inspection teams declared the SANDF contingent to be at insufficient force readiness. According to Mandrup (2008:1-35) the standard of training, discipline and equipment has turned out to be not much better than troops from the other African contributors. This However, the RSA cannot take on its responsibility as a lead nation with relatively weak African partners without the capacity to keep its own equipment in good working order. The low levels of operational readiness also mean that South Africa does not receive any reimbursement for the malfunctioning equipment, putting even more pressure on the already stretched resources of the SANDF. Also, the SANDF has a force cultural problem in the sense that its forces on deployment have so far exhibited an extremely poor disciplinary record. The behaviour of South African troops, especially off duty in both Burundi and the DRC, has been a problem to the RSA and has given the force a bad reputation (Mandrup 2008, 1-35).

The RSA’s defence budget has consistently been reduced and is projected to fall from a previous 4.4 percent to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2009. An additional financial issue is that when the UN reimburses South Africa for peacekeeping missions, the funds go to the Ministry of Finance and are not necessarily paid over to the SANDF for its expenditures (IRIN, 2008:1). According to Buur et al. (2007:840) even though South Africa is considered to be a regional power, the SANDF has been unable to live up to the expectation that leaders in the MONUC HQ had before hand. In essence the SANDF’s , in its current state, does not possess the capacity to act as a lead nation in PSO.

It is thus debatable to what extent the RSA should be involved in PSO. The country has large-scale unemployment, widespread poverty, poor border control, soaring inflation, high food prices, and a high crime rate as major problems. Helfrich (2008:1) observe other areas of concern in the SANDF: figures disclosed in the defence annual report indicate that the defence force has a vacancy rate of 15%, but a vacancy as high as 40% in key areas. There is a 30% shortage of combat-ready soldiers. The report noted that 6 700 people left the SANDF in 2007/08, with 1660 having departed from critical occupations.

SAAF is losing pilots and technical specialists while the SAN is losing sailors, divers, submariners and navy engineers, leaving for higher wages. The SA Army is losing intelligence personnel, air defence artillery and artillery specialists. The policy of affirmative action has impacted on this situation, as it leads to juniors being appointed in positions way above their ceiling. The exodus of skilled staff, leave only a handful of experienced personnel to guide and mentor the rest who have limited or no combat experience. The misalignment between Defence Policy and resource allocation, and the increasing requirements to provide military capabilities for peace and humanitarian missions placed on the Department of Defence (DOD), has necessitated the updating of the White Paper on Defence (1996) and the Defence Review (1998) to review policy.

Should the SANDF continue with peace support operations on the African Continent?

Ex President Nelson Mandela (1993) put forward the national value, “South Africa cannot escape its African destiny”. The answer to this is a reserved “yes”, but an operational pause is desperately needed to review the total approach to PSO. Politicians must realise that if they want the SANDF to play the lead nation role, it must release more funds to it. According to Engelbrecht (2008:22) the defence budget should increase by at least 30%. Heitman (Daily News, 30 Aug 05) agrees that sustained expenditure of around 2% of GDP is required to undo damage done since 1990. Such an increase should assist the SANDF to achieve a credible force design. Taking a realistic view the SANDF should then be able to deploy and sustain at least three mission-ready and fit battalions available for PSO. This requires nine battalions in total: for every one in the field there should be one in training and one in rest/on leave. Extra funding should be channelled into the “landward capability”, meaning modernisation and renewal of SANDF elements mainly in support of PSO. The SA Army must be refurbished with new IGV, B-vehicles and better body armour and more night vision equipment. A strategic air- and sealift capability is also very important if the SANDF wants to project forces far away from home.

CONCLUSION

The rest of the world will continue to expect that the RSA to it take a lead in dealing with criseses in Africa. However, political commitment has to be followed up by actual commitment. The SANDF will have to cooperate with often weak African or Southern African Development Community (SADC) partners, meaning that the demands on the RSA’s contribution are likely to increase In effect, the clash between the over-deployment of SANDF and the reality of its funding and capabilities means that troops committed to the SADC brigade might not be available. Subsequently, a reserved, “yes” to stay involved is feasible only If funding is available, otherwise the reserved answer will obviously be a “no- no” in the absence of a strategic budget.

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