DE MONTFORT'S THESIS ON PEACEKEEPING CHAPTER TWO

CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter contains the theoretical framework that has informed this research. The literature reviewed includes the doctrinal approaches of the United Kingdom (UK), United States of America (USA), and Nordic countries, Netherlands, France and Canada. The learning programs of UNITAR POCI, papers from the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS), journals, newspapers and internet searches produced valuable information. The review demarcated to include learning programs, doctrine and papers on issues of geo-politics, security studies, civil-military coordination (CIMIC), and PSO.
The chapter starts with the definition of key concepts from a variety of viewpoints. The discussion begins with an overview of the approach to PSO during and post Cold War. It attempts to explain the evolution of peacekeeping operations during these periods and tries to illustrate the major consequences of doctrinal confusion.
Sections 1 is on international peacekeeping and discusses and compares the doctrine of the UK, Canada, USA, the Netherlands, France and the Nordic countries. For the potential peacekeeper in Africa it is important to have an international knowledge basis as starting point to project his/her own perspectives on PSO in Africa.
Section 2 gives an overview of geo-political and security matters in the international and national arena. This is necessary in order for the peacekeeper to understand the environment in which he/she is expected to operate.
Section 3 takes a brief look at PSO in Africa and the possible role of the SANDF in peace missions on the African continent. Section 4 discusses CIMIC and includes aspects of humanitarian operations. These are important issues, as the military is not the only role player in peace operations.
Section 5 introduces the UNITAR POCI system of correspondence instruction courses by giving an overview of the learning programmes available. The courses are of a generic nature and not aimed at a specific country or doctrine.
2.2 DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS
Civilian and Military Cooperation (CIMIC) became necessary to find a mechanism that would improve interaction between civilians and the military (Hårleman, 2003:82), how civilian and military peacekeepers coordinate their efforts and work together to achieve the peace operations’ mandate and goals (Standard Generic Training Module 10, 2003:1).
The resources and arrangements which support the relationship between commanders and the national authorities, civil and military, and civil populations in an area where military forces are or plan to be employed (Netherlands Ministry of Defence, 2000:332).

Conflict prevention is action taken to prevent disputes from developing between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur (Department of National Defence Canada, 2000:6-1).
Preventive actions can prevent a crisis developing into an armed conflict and can serve to stabilise and perhaps improve the economic and social situation in an affected area and prevent suffering (Netherlands Ministry of Defence, 2000:170).
Consent. UN Peace-keeping Operations are established with the consent and cooperation of the main parties involved in a conflict (Standard Generic Training Module 1B, 2003:13).
UN Peacekeeping operations are established with the consent and cooperation of the main parties involved in the conflict (Department of National Defence Canada, 2000:6-1).
Demobilisation is the opposite of recruiting combatants for an armed group. In the military sense, demobilisation entails either disbanding an armed unit, reducing the number of combatants in an armed group, or it represents an interim stage before reassembling entire armed forces (Gleichmann, Odenwald, Steenken and Wilkinson, 2004:15).
Reducing the level of armed forces personnel and equipment present in the area of operations to the levels agreed in a peace settlement (Netherlands Ministry of Defence, 2000:333).
Disaster relief operations in general aim at easing the living conditions for populations severely affected by a natural disaster (Hårleman: 2003: 81).
Disarmament refers primarily to the reduction and eventual elimination of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Disarmament also refers to part of a demobilisation process often monitored by an international organisation (Hårleman, 2003:39).
Disarmament is the process whereby armed forces are relieved of their weapons in a controlled manner (Netherlands Ministry of Defence, 2000:333).
It is the assembly, control and disposal of weapons (Standard Generic Training Module 1B, 2003:13).
Humanitarian operations execute to relieve human suffering. Military humanitarian activities may accompany or be in support of humanitarian operations conducted by specialised civilian organisations (UK Ministry of Defence, 2004:1-1).
Most modern UN peacekeeping operations are deployed in response to complex emergencies. Complex emergencies usually imply large-scale human rights abuses, food shortages, and breakdown of basic social services like health and education, and people fleeing the conflict or searching for food and other basic needs, thus becoming refugees and/or internally displaced people (IDPs) (Standard Generic Training Module 9, 2003:3).
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) applicable to armed conflicts involves international rules established by treaty or custom, which are specifically intended to solve humanitarian problems that arise directly from international or non-international armed conflicts. For humanitarian reasons, these rules protect persons and property that are or may be affected by conflict (Bouvier, 2000:3).
Peace support operations (PSO) are multi-functional operations involving military forces and diplomatic humanitarian agencies. Their objective is to achieve humanitarian goals or a long-term political settlement and they are impartial in support of a UN mandate. This mandate includes peacekeeping, peace enforcement, conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian operations (UK Ministry of Defence, 2004:1-1).
According to the Netherlands Ministry of Defence, (2000:333) PSO is impartial NATO military operations arising from an internationally recognised organisation’s request for military assistance to retain, establish or enforce peace in an area or region.
The Norcaps PSO manual volume 1 (2002:41) describes PSO as multi-functional operations conducted impartially in support of a UN mandate involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies and are designed to achieve to achieve a long-term political settlement or other conditions specified in the mandate.
The term PSO should be used to refer to all military activities in support of a peace mission. This includes military activities in support of predominantly political activities such preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peace building (South African National Defence Force: 2005: 1-2).
Peace operations are military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement and categorized as peacekeeping operations (PK) and peace enforcement operations (PE) (USA Department of Defence, 1995: 40).
Peacekeeping (PK) is a UN presence in the field, with the consent of the conflicting parties, to implement or monitor the implementations of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts and their resolution or to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1995:5).
Peacekeeping was developed as a series of ad hoc practical mechanism used by the UN to help contain armed conflicts and settle them by peaceful means. The mechanism devised by the UN to ensure international peace and security is outlined in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter (Standard Generic Training Module 1b, 2003:5).
PK is operations which, with the consent of the warring factions, support political activities to maintain or achieve peace (Netherlands Ministry of Defence, 2000:333).
PK operations are undertaken under chapter VI of the UN Charter and are conducted with the consent of all major parties to a conflict to monitor and control implementation of a peace agreement (UK Ministry of Defence, 2004:1-1).
Peacekeeping is the containment, moderation and /or termination of hostilities between or within states through various mediums to complement the political process of conflict resolution and to restore and maintain peace (Shaw and Cilliers, 1995:2).


PK are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement (USA Department of Defence, 1995: 40).
Peace enforcement operations (PE) restore peace between warring parties which, in principle, do not all consent to the intervention of a peace force (Netherlands Ministry of Defence, 2000:341).
The SANDF describes PE as activities where, in terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it is necessary to use armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations where peace is threatened. The use of armed force will only be authorised when all other peaceful means have failed (South African National Defence Force, 2005:1-3).
When all other efforts fail, Chapter VII of the Charter provides authority for enforcement, and includes the use of armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security (Department of National Defence Canada, 2000: 6-2).
According to Shaw and Cilliers, (1995:2) PE define under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as using military means to restore peace in an area of conflict.
PE operations are coercive operations undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and are conducted when the belligerent parties may not consent to intervention (UK Ministry of Defence, 2004:3).

PE is the application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order (USA Department of Defence, 1995: 41).
Peacemaking covers the diplomatic activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a rapid peaceful settlement. They may include the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation, diplomatic pressure, isolation and sanctions (UK Ministry of Defence, 2004:1-1).
Peacemaking is the range of diplomatic actions aimed at establishing a peaceful settlement once conflict is in progress or has resumed (Shaw and Cilliers, 1995:2).
Peacemaking is diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to negotiated agreements through peaceful means (Department of National Defence Canada, 2000: 6-1).
Peacemaking is a process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation or other forms of peaceful consultation in order to end a conflict (Netherlands Ministry of Defence, 200:341).
Peacemaking is diplomatic actions to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement through peaceful means (The Norcaps PSO manual volume 1, 2002:41).
Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to conflict (USA Department of Defence, 1995: 40).
Peace building is critical in the aftermath of conflict. It includes the identification and support of measures and structures that will promote peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1995:5).
Peace building may occur at any stage in the conflict cycle, but is critical in the aftermath of a conflict. It includes activities such as the identification and support of measures and structures that will promote peace and build trust, and the facilitation of interaction among former enemies in order to prevent a relapse into conflict (South African National Defence Force, 2005:1-3).
Peace building is critical in the aftermath of conflict. It includes the identification and support of measures and structures, which will promote peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (Department of National Defence Canada, 2000: 6-2).
Peace building is actions taken after conflict to identify and support structures that strengthen and solidify a peace settlement in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (Shaw and Cilliers, 1995:3).
Preventive diplomacy involves diplomatic steps which are in effect taken before an expected crisis and are designed to remove the cause of the conflict. The aim is to prevent the use of force. Preventive measures may also be taken to prevent the spread or intensification of the limited use of force. Conflict prevention operations such as the preventive deployment of units can support the process with military assets (Netherlands Ministry of Defence, 2000:16).
Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur (UK Ministry of Defence, 2004:1-1).
Preventive diplomacy consists of diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence (USA Department of Defence, 1995: 41).
Reintegration is defined here as the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain access to civilian forms of work and income. It is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at local level. It forms part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility often necessitating external assistance (Gleichmann et al. 2004:15).
2.3 DISCUSSION
Consent is one of the important keystones of peacekeeping. Since the end of the Cold War, (1989-1990), however, peacekeeping has changed fundamentally. Peacekeeping no longer limit only to military operations conducted with the consent of all major parties to a conflict to monitor and control implementation of a peace agreement. These changes have had major implications as concepts such as consent, no longer have a universally accepted meaning.
From the definition of key concepts it is clear that terms and definitions concerning PSO are sometimes mixed up whether talking political or military language. This leads to misunderstandings (Norcaps PSO manual volume 1, 2002:40).
Distinctions between concepts are often unclear (Shaw and Cilliers, 1995:2). Within the PSO arena, experience has shown that different Government Departments and agencies, including vitally important Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO’s) frequently use the same terms and phrases but ascribe different meanings to them (South African National Defence Force, 2005:1-2).
In the absence of a uniform peacekeeping doctrine within the UN, different nations tend to emphasise different aspects of concepts. It is impossible to have a coherent peacekeeping mission, when troop contributors fail to agree on the purpose, strategy, and conduct of an operation. The challenge to multi-national PSO is thus obvious (Potgieter, 1996:1).
The development of UN peacekeeping divide in two distinct periods: during the Cold War (1945 to 1988) and post Cold War after 1989. The founders of the UN had not foreseen the possibility of engaging in peacekeeping operations; thus, it is not mentioned at all in the original UN Charter. However, just after World War II, tensions between the USA and the Soviet Union, known as the Cold War, emerged and significantly affected the operation of the UN. As a result of the increasing disagreement between the two superpowers, the original collective security system, which was based on peace enforcement by the Security Council and consensus by major powers, became unworkable. This led to the conception of peacekeeping (Liu, 1999: 1-123).
'First generation' operations, typical of the first forty years of UN peacekeeping, were characterised by unarmed or lightly armed troops. Peacekeepers deployed to stabilise cease-fires between the regular armies of states, while trying to find a political solution. These operations were predicated on the consent of the warring parties, and dependent for success on the neutrality and impartiality of a UN force, which would only use arms to defend their lives or their mandate (Malan, 1996:3).
Before 1989, a gradual evolution of peacekeeping concepts is observable, as well as continuity in participating countries that trained their troops in the tasks of peacekeeping. The product of this development, the training and the continuity brought about by regular participants, is an unambiguous joint UN peacekeeping approach. The major troop contributing countries formed a significant consensus about what peacekeeping is and when to use it during the period preceding 1989 (Cilliers, 1996:2).
A fundamental change came about in 1989. 'Second generation' operations, after the Cold War presented the opportunity to end proxy Cold War conflicts through negotiated settlements. The UN and/or other multinational organisations guided the adversaries to political settlements based on compromise (Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique and Angola). The UN became involved in ending internal conflicts through a multi-dimensional process that included activities such as the separation of combatants; the disarmament of irregular forces; the demobilisation and transformation of regular and irregular forces into a unified army; the establishment of new policing systems; and the monitoring of elections for new governments (Malan 1996:3).
So after forty years of relative clarity on the role and functions of UN peacekeeping, the 1990s have witnessed a peacekeeping debate of such complexity that it is difficult to figure out exactly what 'peacekeeping' is all about (Malan 1998:3).
Almost all of the post Cold War missions have been spoiled by ambiguous mandates, that may imply forceful action to enforce a settlement, without an clear command or the provision of appropriate troops and resources to use such a forceful approach (Cilliers, 1996:4).
The challenges and risks of peacekeeping missions after 1989 differ dramatically from prior ones. ’Third generation’ missions presently take place during civil wars that are far more difficult to resolve than interstate wars, and have a multitude of first-time political, humanitarian, and military components. These factors produced an unusual degree of complexity, volatility, and vulnerability for PSO in the 1990s.
Not only has the nature of peacekeeping tasks changed, the participants in peacekeeping operations have also changed. Until 1988, UN peacekeeping had a regular pool of contributing nations, consisting of the core states of Canada, Ireland, Italy, Australia and the Nordic countries (Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark). Canada is the only member state that has participated in all thirteen peacekeeping operations between 1948 and 1987. In the missions undertaken between 1989 and October 1993, the role-players changed. Canada remains the only country to participate in every UN peacekeeping mission and the rate of participation by the Nordic countries, Ireland, Australia and Italy remains high. However, during this period Argentina participated in nine operations, France in eight operations, being the largest troop contributor during this time, the US and Austria each in seven operations, Russia in six operations, and the UK in four operations (Huldt, 1995: 106-107).

Currently, UN peacekeeping personnel come from 112 countries with the top 10 troop contributors: Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Jordan, Nepal, Ghana, Uruguay, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa. Over 67 percent of all UN military and police personnel come form the developing nations and less than 5.8 percent from the EU and about 0.5 percent from the USA (Deen, 2006:5).
These new contributing states have brought with them the complications arising from inadequate experience in peacekeeping missions. They often utilise idiosyncratic definitions of key terms, and adopt competing ideas of what peacekeeping is and how to execute it.
The infusion of new states in PSO and the changed tasks of peacekeeping have led to a proliferation of national peacekeeping doctrines. In order to understand how these doctrines deviate from traditional notions of UN peacekeeping, section one discusses and compares the peacekeeping approach of the Nordic countries, UK, Netherlands, Canada, USA and France.
2.3.1 SECTION 1: PSO FROM AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
2.3.1.1 Nordic PSO
The Nordic countries were regular participants in PSO before 1989. During the Cold War period the concept of peacekeeping was well defined and all participating parties had consensus. This suggests that their doctrine embrace traditional peacekeeping as described in the Nordic tactical manual of 2002 and is developed for use by Nordic troops.
The manual volume 1 and 2 by Buur, Vienola, Ohlsson and Terp (2002:5), is based on previous Nordic experience of UN and other PSO up to 2001. The aim of the manual is to standardise PSO tactics and techniques.
The Nordic approach to PSO includes the consent of the parties, neutrality and impartiality and the use of weapons in self-defence only. Peacekeepers are neutral observers and do not take part in hostilities (ibid, p.25).
Neutrality implies not taking sides in a conflict situation. The consent of parties is crucial to the success of peacekeepers in accomplishing their mission, because it signals the willingness of parties to cooperate. To maintain the consent of belligerent parties, peacekeepers must remain neutral and impartial. If one of the parties perceives that peacekeepers are taking sides, consent may be withdrawn and hostilities may start again, and peacekeepers might come under attack. Concepts such as the non-use of arms, negotiation and mediation are basic principles to restore a situation of peace.
The Nordic approach to the use of force is that if force is to be used, the extent and range will be confined to what is strictly necessary. This approach is based on the experience of many UN operations and the principle that force generates force. By using more force than strictly necessary, the danger will be that tensions rises and the possibility of negotiations will lessen (ibid, p.55).
The Nordic countries have rejected the view that there is a grey area between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. According to them, the two kinds of operations clearly divide by the absence or presence of consent by the warring parties, and the limited use of force in self-defence (ibid, p.69).
2.3.1.2 United Kingdom (UK)
UK doctrine focuses more at the operational level. It concentrates on broad concepts and principles and is not intended to be prescriptive, recognising that doctrine has not been fully tested and is likely to require revision (UK, Ministry of Defence, 2004: V).
The UK took the basic peacekeeping philosophy in the Nordic Manuals and attempted to stretch it for adaptation by full-time professional armies, and to make it more robust and suitable for the more uncertain circumstances in which forces found themselves more frequently operating.
The UK military first defined PSO to cover PK and PE operations, but is now use it more widely to embrace not only PK and PE, but also those other peace related operations, for example, conflict prevention, peace making, peace building and humanitarian operations. UK PSO is increasingly in response to complex intra-state conflicts involving widespread human rights violations as opposed to more traditional PK. Such complex emergencies require a composite response, involving diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. According to UK doctrine without the active and willing involvement of the Host Nation, there can be no self-sustaining peace. UK military activities are conducted with either a PK or PE profile (ibid, p.1-1).
UK PSO considerations unavoidably draw to the fundamentals of consent, impartiality and their relationship with the application of force. Firstly, peacekeeping is dependent on the consent of the parties and the promotion of co-operation. The general notion that there is a boundary of consent, however, is only perceived as being relevant from the perspective of a lightly armed PK force. For a combat-capable PSO force, consent is an important consideration but not as a boundary which cannot be easily and frequently recrossed. From a broader PSO force perceptive, there is no border line of consent. The concept of neutrality shifted to one of impartiality. The key difference is that neutrality suggests observation and passivity, while impartiality requires principled judgements in relation to the mandate and endorses consequential impartial responses (Wilkinson, 1998:6).
The British approach to the use of force evolved from ‘no use of force’ to ‘minimum use of force’, to ‘minimum necessary use of force’. The British see the need to define the grey area between peacekeeping and war, so as to offer policymakers a wider range of more appropriate options (ibid, p.8).
2.3.1.3 Netherlands
This publication focuses primarily on the actions at the operational and tactical level by formations (brigade, division) and units (battalions). It also gives guidance for operations at the lower levels, thus presenting a cohesive picture of peace operations (Amersfoort, Roozenbeek and Klep, 1999:13).
The Netherlands use allied joint doctrine, the military concept for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on PSO and the British joint warfare publication on PSO as a common foundation for operating in a NATO context. The Royal Netherlands Army operate in peace operations in a multinational setting, adhering to two relevant international approaches, namely that of the UN and that of NATO. These approaches can be regarded as complementary. The ability to work together (interoperability) during peace operations are thus enhanced (ibid, p.14).
Doctrine promotes a military approach to peace operations. The Netherlands doctrine differentiates between peacekeeping operations and acknowledges that it has changed considerably over the years. A distinction has therefore been made between traditional (‘first-generation’) and new (‘second-generation’) peacekeeping operations.
First-generation peacekeeping operations are operations in which an international organisation deploys a force between two or more (warring) parties who consent to this action. This gives the international community the opportunity to seek a political solution to the conflict. The activities of the peace force are mainly concentrated on the prevention of hostilities and, if possible, establishing a dialogue between the parties (ibid, p.74)
Second-generation peacekeeping operations are usually operations in which troops are deployed, again with the consent of the parties involved, in support of a political solution and to supervise the observance of a peace settlement. In second-generation operations, the force operates throughout the conflict area and not just in a buffer zone (ibid, p.75).
As far as the desired end state is concerned, the distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcing is irrelevant. Both are, after all, intended to achieve the same goal: a stable situation with a good chance of peace for the long term. The distinguishing criterion is the consent to the presence of and operations by the peace force.

This criterion would appear in itself to be clear, employable and measurable, but the situations in practice are usually less clear and difficult to assess. Thus there may indeed be consent at the strategic level (the national government or the leaders of a party) or at the operational level (local authorities and commanders of large units or formations), but at the tactical level (the local ‘warlord’, the mayor or the police), consent and cooperation may not be forthcoming as a result of a disturbed balance of power in one of the parties. There may also be a difference between the degree of consent which has been achieved at the political level and the extent of compliance with the peace agreement at the executive level. This means that the distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcing can be extremely blurred (ibid, p.78).
The doctrine is based mainly on the promotion of confidence and cooperation. Both aspects thus have a direct impact on the degree of consent to the presence of and actions by the peace force. A primary condition for consent is the possibility of clearly identifying the parties in the conflict, which need to give their consent. The degree of consent can be subject to frequent and sudden change. If consent to the operation is doubtful, direct efforts must be made at all levels to stabilise and promote this consent. Ideally, this is done through dialogue and by peaceful means. Political pressure, sanctions, the threat of force or the controlled use of force are options. Once the boundary between peacekeeping and peace-enforcing has been crossed, the capacity for a credible degree of force is essential for the success of the operation. One must bear in mind, however, that this is a peace support operation and not a war. This means that any loss of consent must be won back. This is extremely difficult to put into practice, which means that it will not be easy for the peace force to rebuild a bond of trust and good cooperation with the parties. For a peacekeeping power which has lost consent across the board, the chance of implementing the mandate is virtually nonexistent; the only remaining option for the force is to withdraw from the theatre of operations (ibid, p.82).
Two basic principles are important for restraint or minimum necessary force: necessity and proportionality. Necessity means that force may only be used if it is essential in order to achieve the military objective and other means are inadequate. Proportionality means that force must be kept to the minimum level needed to achieve that objective. Both principles set limitations on where, when and to what extent troops may use force. Unnecessary use of force has an adverse effect on the impartiality and credibility of the troops. Excessive force may jeopardise the consent of the parties in the conflict and the chances of long-term success.
These principles must not, incidentally, be taken to mean that troops should refrain from using force altogether. If the situation so demands, they should certainly not hesitate to use force. In any event, the right of self-defence applies at all times. Any use of force beyond this, for example to secure freedom of movement, must be authorised by the rules of engagement (ibid, p.96).
2.3.1.4 USA - Military Operations other than War (MOOTW)
This publication provides basic concepts and principles to guide the services and combatant commands to prepare for and conduct MOOTW. MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises (USA Joint Doctrine, J3 - MOOTW: 1995: 13).
According to USA doctrine MOOTW principles are an extension of war fighting doctrine. Although MOOTW and war may often seem similar in action, MOOTW focus on deterring war and promoting peace while war encompasses large-scale, sustained combat operations. MOOTW are more sensitive to political considerations and often the military may not be the primary role player. More restrictive rules of engagement are followed (ibid, p.10).
MOOTW include arms control, combating terrorism, Department of Defence support to counter-drug operations, enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations, enforcing exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and over-flight, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency, non-combatant evacuation operations, protection of shipping, recovery operations, show of force operations, strikes and raids, support to insurgency and peace operations (PO) (ibid, p:25).
PO is military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement and categorized as PK and PE. American doctrine also differentiates between these types op PO. PK Operations are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement (ibid, p.40). The American view of PK upholds the importance of neutrality, impartiality, and minimal use of force.
Joint forces support PE operations to compel compliance with measures designed to establish an environment for cease fire. PE is the application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PE missions include intervention operations, as well as operations to restore order, enforce sanctions, forcibly separate belligerents, and establish and supervise exclusion zones for the purpose of establishing an environment for cease-fire. Unlike PK, such operations do not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties to the conflict (ibid, p.41).
USA doctrine observe a grey area between PK and PE in which cease fires break down, factions withdraw their consent, and new political entities emerge that had no part in the original granting of consent to the PK operation. The existence of a possible grey area means that a force operating in the grey area should be configured to be able to operate as a peace enforcer even when the mandate is more limited (Cilliers, 1996:10).
2.3.1.5 Canada
Canadian doctrine embraces the seven categories (preventive deployment, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, peace building, sanctions and disarmament) the UN has set forth for future efforts to restore peace and security. According to Canadian doctrine these seven concepts reflect the growing scope and complexity of UN activities and provide a useful insight into how the world can more fully embrace and achieve the objectives of the UN Charter (Department of National Defence Canada. 2000: 6-1).
Canadian doctrine distinguishes between PK and PE. PK is a UN presence in the field, with the consent of the parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts and their resolution or to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief. PE on the other hand may be needed when all other efforts fail. The authority for enforcement is provided by Chapter VII of the Charter and includes the use of armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations where there is a threat to peace, breach of peace or an act of aggression (ibid, p.6-2).
The doctrine promulgate that UN peacekeeping operations are established with the consent and the cooperation of the main parties involved in the conflict. A UN Force must be impartial in character. The Canadians believe that the force cannot take sides without becoming part of the conflict (ibid, p.6-2).
The use of force is based on the reasonable belief that a threat exists warranting the use of force. Force must never be more than the minimum necessary to carry out and accomplish assigned objectives or the mission. Deadly force is justified only under conditions of extreme necessity and as a last resort when all lesser means have failed or cannot reasonably be employed (ibid, p.14-1).
Chapters of importance in this doctrine that do not feature in sufficient detail in other PSO publications include hostage survival, the operations centre, peace partners, preventative medicine and stress management (ibid, p.12-1, 17-1, 24-1, 25-1, 26-1).
2.3.1.6 French Peacekeeping
Where other doctrine shows a clear lineage to the traditional, the French demonstrate few misgivings in trying to invent something new. French doctrine refers to France’s colonial heritage and suggests that its experience in policing its colonies is applicable to the challenges of PK today (French Ministry of Defence, nd, op cit).
The French divide peace missions into three: PK, peace-restoring, and PE. PE is intervention with consent of the parties to maintain peace where hostilities have stopped, carried out under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Both peace-restoring and PE occur where war is still being waged, but differ in one respect. In PE a party is designated to be the aggressor in the conflict and must be defeated with force (Cilliers, 1996:9).
Unlike Nordic or British doctrines that require soldiers to have specific PK training, the French doctrine anticipate that fighting instruction and training is the major part of preparing troops for a peace mission (ibid, p.9).
The French label for the principle that should guide their PK operations is "active impartiality". For the French, impartiality is to be determined in relation to the warring parties' compliance with the mandate of an operation. The French consider the mandate a law, and believe that it is the military's role to act as judge and police in ensuring that all parties live up to the law (ibid, p.9).
The French draw a clear distinction between impartiality and neutrality. While a PK force must be impartial, it must not be neutral to some of the actions of the parties present. Impartiality, as a commitment to make parties live up to the mandate, means that some of the behaviour and actions of the parties present must stop or change. Moreover, the monitoring, judging, and policing of the mandate must be active if it wants to be credible (ibid, p.9).



2.3.1.7 Comparison of Doctrines and Approaches
The researcher used the following dimensions in the comparison of approaches and doctrine: the definition of PSO, responses to non-compliance, and the use of force.
Definition of PSO
British and Netherlands doctrine defines various types of PO under the umbrella term of PSO (conflict prevention, peace making, peace building and humanitarian operations). USA doctrine uses the term MOOTW which besides peace missions include 15 other operations than war. Nordic and Canadian doctrine do not use the umbrella term PSO, either, but address peacekeeping and peace-enforcement separately. French doctrine divides peace missions into three, namely: peacekeeping, peace-restoring, and peace enforcement.
However, Nordic, British, American, Dutch, and Canadian doctrine agree what constitutes PK: the dividing line between PK and some of the other peace operations is the consent of the parties, the importance of neutrality and impartiality, and the limited use of force in self-defence. French doctrine differs in that it defines impartiality in terms of the mandate and promulgate that force can be used to force compliance. It acknowledges that the use of force may endanger the perceived neutrality of the force, but defines it as an acceptable risk.
For the Dutch, as far as the desired end state is concerned, the distinction between PK and PE is irrelevant as both intend to achieve the same goal, making a distinction between PK and PE smudged. The Canadian, British, Nordic and American approaches include the use of armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security. The Americans distinguish PE from war. PE is the application of military force, or threat of its use, in order to induce compliance with resolutions designed to restore peace and order. The French concept of peace restoration is thus closer to the American notion of PE, since there is no politically identified enemy. The French notion of PE, on the other hand, is essentially war.
Response to Non-compliance
Both the American and British doctrines, as well as the Nordic approach, agree on how PK should deal with non-compliance by parties who have signed agreements. If the mission has been defined as PK, the only appropriate response to non-compliance by the parties is to observe report and mediate among them. No attempt should be made to compel compliance, either through the use or threat of force, for that would cross the line that separates PK from PE. Impartiality and neutrality do not imply tentativeness in calling attention to violations or cheating by parties, but it does mean that compliance cannot be compelled. The French doctrine defines impartiality in terms of the mandate, not the parties. PK not only involves observing and reporting violations and mediating between the parties when violations occur, but using or threatening force to compel the parties to fulfil their obligations to the mandate when negotiating fails. The French acknowledge that, in holding the parties to their obligations, their neutrality may be jeopardised.


Use of Force
British and Nordic view is categorical: the use of force, if for anything other than self-defence, is likely to escalate violence and discourage compliance with the mandate, because the mission loses its neutrality and legitimacy. The American view leans to that position: it warns of the escalating potential of the use of force. The French doctrine departs from an opposite position and warns of the potential adverse effects of the decision not to use violence. The French position is that the failure of parties to implement their agreements is as likely to result from the unwillingness of the peacekeepers to use force to induce commitment.
Doctrinal Issues
According to Cilliers (1996:13), the examples of Somalia and Bosnia confirm the potential damaging effects of competing doctrines in PK missions. When key contributing states differ on such issues as the importance of consent, the efficiency of the use of force and the need for impartiality and neutrality, the result is likely to be an incoherent and ineffective peace operation.
Also it is clear that the application of traditional PK to situations that do not meet the pre-requisites for PK has had dire consequences in countries such as Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda. These examples cast doubt on whether traditional PK are relevant in today's unpredictable peacekeeping situations, the so called ’third generation’ operations.


In the volatile peacekeeping environment of the 1990s, doctrinal unity among troop contributing countries was important for mission success. Where the UN was successful, it was due in part to the ability of forces to agree on the appropriate rules of conduct of their mission.
Doctrine for peace operations should begin by acknowledging that these operations take place in environments where consent can disappear overnight, may decay over the course of a mission, or may be present at the theatre level, but not at the operational level. Therefore, doctrine should deal with the question of how best to plan, equip and behave under such circumstances.
The key issue is whether it is sensible or damaging to enter into the implementation of civil war agreements, in the light of the ambiguities and short- lived nature of consent.
As having restricted PK doctrine to operations where there is peace to keep and having identified that PE is different from war, it has been possible to define PE and offer guidance for its conduct. The doctrinal approach for PE should offer maximum flexibility in the conduct of operations, offering a wide range of enforcement and consent-promoting techniques (Wilkinson, 1998:7).
The conduct of operations will rely heavily on information operations and other techniques designed to persuade the warring parties that their best interests lie in peace rather than a return to conflict. When and if one of the warring parties fails to comply with the mandate and it becomes necessary for the PSO contingent to use force, the aim would be to re-enforce the peace rather than the physical defeat of the non-complying party (ibid, p.7).
Military efforts that build consent must coordinate into a wider multi-agency ‘hearts and minds’ strategy. Military actions should end conflict by conciliation rather than a short term and superficial conclusion of the conflict by force. Assisting the host nation to establish a stable and self-sustaining peace, not military victory, is the ultimate measure of success in PSO (ibid, p.8).
Military forces may need to conduct combat operations to enforce compliance, but the use of force will be restricted by the long-term requirement to rebuild consent and by the needs of peace building in general. In the conduct of PSO, military forces must be prepared to be placed in support of a civilian agency. It is the responsibility of this head of mission, not of the military force commander, to develop and co-ordinate the mission plan, although the latter will make a significant input into its development (ibid. p.8).
The fundamental question, what is so different about modern operations in complex emergencies – so-called “grey zones”? The answer is in a close examination of the desired end-state of these various operations. Inevitably, the end-state focused on security issues, the creation of conditions in which civilian agencies could redress the causes of the complex emergency and the creation of a self-sustaining peace, rather than the defeat of an opposing force.
Military actions need to be designed to create a secure environment and conditions in which others can build a self-sustaining peace, rather than a on the surface ending of conflict by military force. This suggests doctrine to identify and define an approach to PSO balanced against the long term requirements of peace-building. It is clear that a doctrine separate from war fighting, while acknowledging that the ability to escalate and use force remains a prerequisite in PSO.
Next, there is a broad discussion on geo-politics and security, as it is important that the peacekeeper should have knowledge of the battle space environment in which he/she is going to operate.
2.3.2 SECTION 2: GEO-POLITICS AND SECURITY
2.3.2.1 The Elements of a Geo-political Study
A state exists to protect, foster and give political expression to the nation. Geo-politics, therefore, is the study of the differences, which exist between states. The decision makers in any given state must possess power. If they do not, they would not be able to occupy and retain their decision-making role. Political power in the international sphere classifies as military, economic and power over opinion. Military power is the ultimate basis of power. Power to wage war is dependent upon the geographical factors - location and area, population, resources and industry. The physical attributes of a state include the following: location, size, shape, boundaries and the territorial sea, climate, surface configuration, soils and natural vegetation, as well as water features (SANDF SANWC: nd: 1-82). These elements, taken separately and in combination with one another, are of significance in the study of geo-politics, in Africa.
The economic climate in a poor, underdeveloped Africa is a natural breeding ground for evolutionary influences that create instability. No portion of the world today accommodates poorer, more dependent nations than Africa (Papp, 1988:129-130).
The communication systems of the continent leave much to desire and the shortage of good and adequate roads, railways and air communications restricts the economic development and progress of all states (ibid, p 130).
The considerable stress caused by relatively little arable land hastens the process of urbanisation. The "cities”, however, are not in a position economically fit to absorb all these people, with the result that slums develop, which leads to unstable conditions (ibid, p.130).
The high population growth rate in Africa in general has led to pessimism over Africa's inability to win the fight against illiteracy. Illiteracy in Africa estimates to be as high as 74%. Human development can only occur with good health. Yet, most people in the poverty-stricken regions of the third world suffer from a combination of longstanding malnutrition, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis (TB) and other diseases, which, in turn, affect productivity (ibid, p. 130).
The political climate in Africa has made the economic dilemma on the continent worse rather than better. Pan-African aspirations and promises of freedom have only brought frustration (Africa Contemporary Record, 1981:97).
However, Africa as a whole assumed new and greater relevance for political action by external actors, inline with African interests and the long-term interests of the international community. The interest in Africa is in many respects, not with peace and security per se, but with threats faced by third parties (USA, Europe and China) as well as their concrete interests such as energy supply and migration (Klingebiel, 2005: 39).

It is necessary to bear in mind that Africa is the home of various important raw materials, which are of vital importance in an industrial world. Africa is becoming an increasingly important factor in global energy markets. It currently contributes 12 percent of the world's oil production. With instability in other oil-producing regions and the rising energy demands of China and India, Africa is an increasingly attractive resource (Wolfe, 2005: 1-4).
The aforementioned paragraphs gave a brief insight into social, political, and economic climate of the African continent. Although generalised it gives the peacekeeper a broad overview of the African battle space conditions. The next few paragraphs provide a short discussion of the security – development nexus concerning international politics, Africa and RSA studies.
2.3.2.2 International Politics
The major political actors in the world have been trying to find ways to a new formula of stability following the collapse of the bipolar framework set up by the Cold War. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989-1990, the conventional wisdom had it that the USA was the sole remaining "superpower," bringing the possibility of a unipolar order (Weinstein, 2004:1).
Through the 1990s, a new paradigm of world order seemed to be emerging put concisely by the term "globalisation." Globalisation signalled a comprehensive transformation of social organisation in which peaceful economic competition would replace military conflict (ibid, p.1).

However, a complex political world also harbours opposing tendencies such as Islamic revolutionaries, reactionary nationalism, HIV/AIDS crisis, failed states, resource wars in Africa, an unresolved conflict between Israel and Palestine. The attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, brought forward Islamic revolution as a threat to world security (ibid, p.2).
The initial response to the attacks was an invasion of Afghanistan to remove al-Qaeda and depose the Taliban regime. The decision by the Bush administration to effect regime change in Iraq militarily accompany in the present period of a drift toward multipolarity. Nuclear proliferation in states outside and within the globalisation system is a major concern (ibid, p.2).
The major threat in the new environment of uncertainty is the spread of militarization around the world, as regional powers grid themselves to advance and defend their interests. Remember that the USA is powerful but it is not invincible…it needs the help of other countries (Van der Westhuizen, 2005: 3).
2.3.2.3 Africa Studies
The events of September 11, 2001, had severe consequences for African development and security. With world attention focused on the so-called “war on terror”, Africa’s development and security concerns have taken a backseat despite assurances that the continent’s problems will not be edited from the international agenda (Daniels, 2005:3).
In all other regions of the world, the incidence of civil war has been on a broadly declining trend over the past thirty years, but in Africa, the long-term trend has been upwards (Collier, 2004:1).
Africa’s wars in the 1990s were all very different in their specifics. Nevertheless, they share a number of important characteristics. Firstly, one of the main underlying causes of these wars was the weakness, corruption, high level of militarization and, in some cases, the complete collapse, of the states involved. Secondly, they all involved multiple belligerents fighting for a variety of often shifting economic and political motivations. Thirdly, they all had serious regional dimensions and regional implications. Fourthly they were all remarkable for the brutality of the tactics (ranging from mass murder and ethnic cleansing, amputation, starvation, forced labour, rape and cannibalism) used by belligerents to secure their strategic objectives (Porteous, 2004: 1-5).
For the near future, the highest demographic risks of civil conflict remain concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa (Cincotta et al. 2003:13).
However, for perhaps the first time in a generation, Africa presents a picture of hope – although it differs from region to region. The AU and Africa as a whole have accepted the concept of NEPAD. NEPAD is a state-centric initiative, pitched at the level of African political leadership taking responsibility for the continents development. The five core principles of NEPAD are good governance; entrenchment of democracy, peace, stability and security; sound economic policy-making and execution; productive partnerships; and domestic ownership and leadership (Cilliers, 2004:5-50).
2.3.2.4 RSA Studies
South Africa forms an integral part of Africa and its footprints on the political, economic, social and humanitarian landscape are experienced and appreciated around the continent (Daniels, 2005:1-9).
The end of apartheid in South Africa has considerably increased prospects for security in southern Africa. South Africa's memberships in SADC and the AU, as well as efforts to mediate in conflicts across Africa have highlighted its new role as a stabilising and mediating force (Klasen and Zulu, nd: 43-62).
The changing security environment requires a multi-disciplinary approach to conflict resolution, incorporating the "political, economic, social, cultural and personal security… (In addition) that appropriate responses…must include a focus on effective governance, robust democracies and continuous economic and social development (Cilliers, 1999:1-16).
With no short-term solutions or 'quick fixes' for many of the conflicts on the continent, South Africa will have to carefully choose which resources to deploy, where these resources are most required and which environment best reflects its national interests. The SANDF will always be expected and compelled to act in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force, notwithstanding the nature or the place of operations (SA Ministry of Defence Instruction, 2001:1-15). Military strategy consists of the es­tablishment of military objectives, the formulation of military strategic concepts to accomplish the objec­tives and the use of military resources to implement the concepts. When any of these basic elements is incompatible with the others, national security may be in danger (Lykke, 1997: 183-186).
To conclude, accept that development is inevitably a slow process. There is no recipe for overnight success. In due course clearer distinctions will emerge between capitalism and socialism in Africa and in the relative performance of both in meeting the challenge of development. It is important for the professional military officer to understand the dynamics of the geo-politics in order to analyse the battle space. It is also important for him/her to understand the political, social and economic dynamics of Africa and the factors that could threaten the security and stability of the region. Next, the researcher briefly discusses PSO in the African context.
2.3.3 SECTION 3: PSO IN AFRICA
Geopolitical developments over the past ten years have triggered a new type of conflict. The end of the Cold War brought several proxy wars to a close, but it also meant that weak states have become more vulnerable to internal strife and, in some cases, disintegrated into failed states torn apart by armed combat between hosts of local power centres (Studer, 2001: 367-391).
One of the most disturbing features of these new conflicts is that, very often, civilians are no longer “caught in the crossfire,” but deliberately targeted on account of their group identity. The high price paid by the civilian population and the destabilisation of entire regions have given rise to a greater need for military intervention to restore peace and security (ibid, p367-391).
Some of the most challenging conflicts in the world at the moment are in Africa: the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan and less-than-transparent governments and ongoing uncertainty in Sierra Leone, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), for example. In many cases, the developed world watches these conflicts develop, as in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and does nothing to intervene. When it did intervene, most often in the form of a UN peacekeeping mission, the results have been mixed. Some projects have succeeded, while many have failed to suppress violence or restore order in the countries to which they deployed. By the start of 2005, the UN had led seven peace operations in Africa: in Burundi, the Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia/Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the western Sahara, with an eighth operation planned for Sudan (ibid, p.367-391).
Regional groups such the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU are focusing on building their own capacity to carry out peacekeeping operations in Africa. The UN and western nations support the conduct of theses missions, and are happy to have African soldiers patrolling African conflicts (ibid, p.367-391).
Many factors contributed to the need for peacekeeping missions in Africa, not least the continent's history of colonialism and conflict. The end of the Cold War coincided with the collapse of state institutions in countries such as Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone and the Congo (DRC). Disputes over natural resources, diamonds in Sierra Leone and gold and cobalt in the DRC, led to armed conflict that evolved into guerilla warfare involving mercenaries, warlords, militias and child soldiers (Pan, 2005: 1-15).
A massive influx of weapons and small arms from Eastern Europe since the 1990s feed the conflicts in Africa. The unrest and armed violence in many African countries with no central governing authority cause instability that often spilled over borders. This is particularly true in West Africa, where longstanding cultural and trade ties cross national lines (ibid, p.1-15).
The AU models on the European Union (EU) and aims at promoting democracy, human rights and economic development across Africa. The AU relies on regional bodies such as ECOWAS and SADC to provide forces and support for PK operations. The AU's Peace and Security Council is overseeing the establishment of a permanent African security force, known as the Africa Standby Force (ASF) (ibid, 1-15).
By 2010, the AU plans to have five or six brigades of 5,000 troops each, stationed around Africa, and able to respond to any unrest. The international community, including the Group of Eight (G8) countries, which established an Africa Action Plan in 2002 to pledge funding and logistical support for African-led peacekeeping operations, support the idea of an ASF (ibid, p1-15).
It is in this new era of peacekeeping that South Africa has declared itself willing to contribute to peace operations under the auspices of the UN, AU, and the SADC. With no short-term solutions or 'quick fixes' for many of the conflicts on the continent, South Africa need to carefully choose which resources to deploy, where these resources are most required and which environment best reflects its national interests (Kent and Malan, 2003: 1-5).
Given the asymmetry in the region, the hegemonic nature of South Africa's economic position and the nature of African state collapse, the country and the region requires a new paradigm that can serve to motivate and frame the engagement of issues of good governance, corruption and democracy in a manner that does not directly threaten African leaders of long standing. In the process, the challenge for South Africa is to lead by example and not through dominance. It is an immense challenge, but one that the country must face, if it is to survive and eventually prosper (Cilliers, 1999:1-16).

Current doctrine acknowledges that while PSO will be supported by CIMIC, the prime responsibility for peace building rests with civilian agencies. The view is that the most cost-effective use of scarce resources can be achieved by the early development of a multi-agency strategy or mission plan. This should draw together the activities of the various agencies so as to achieve both unity of purpose and effort. This plan need to develop an entry strategy to co-ordinate the incremental engagement of various agencies into the mission and to define lines of operation, objectives, main effort, exit strategies and co-ordination mechanisms. It may well be that the main effort does not lie with the military.
2.3.4 SECTION 4: CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION (CIMIC)
The large number of multidimensional actors present in today’s complex peace operations and the broad range of issues they deal with have made coordination among the various multifunctional actors a crucial element in the success of these missions (Standard Generic Training Module 10, 2003:1-14).
Coordination is needed among the various components of a UN peace operation, the UN mission and other international, bilateral and NGO components, local government/administration and the parties to the conflict. International and local multidimensional actors include the humanitarian relief community, the peace building and development community, military peacekeepers, civilian police and others involved in the criminal justice system, human rights organisations, election specialists and observers, as well as those responsible for conflict prevention and peacemaking (ibid, p.1-14).

The relationship between humanitarian and military activities and cooperation between those engaged in them occupies an important place in the current international debate on crisis management. Multidimensional peace-support operations may focus on tasks in the civilian and humanitarian domain. Such an extension could lead to potentially problematic relations and even competition between the military and humanitarian organisations (ibid, p.1-14).
More importantly, if the dividing line between humanitarian and military action is blurred, the very concept of humanitarian action are undermined. The simultaneous presence of humanitarian organisations in situations of armed conflict and mandated PE forces require a complementary, two-pronged approach: on the one hand, a contribution to the political resolution of the conflict that takes into account its underlying causes and on the other, the alleviation of the civilian population's suffering due to the crisis (Studer, 2001: 367-391).
Next, the learning programs of UNITAR POCI present a generic training program in which all peacekeepers around the globe could participate, to establish a sound basic knowledge of peace missions.
2.3.5 SECTION 5: UNITAR POCI LEARNING PROGRAMS
One of the most important purposes of the UN is “to maintain international peace and security to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats.” PK provides the UN with one of the means of achieving international peace and security. It has developed as a pragmatic response to problems requiring the UN actions (Standard Generic Training Module 1A, 2003: 1).
UNITAR POCI offers 18 different self-paced correspondence learning programs, all of which are available in English. Learners that enroll in these courses include commissioned military officers, non-commissioned officers, diplomats, NGO employees, humanitarian workers, teachers, civilian police, and ordinary citizens interested in peace.
After a learner has studied all lessons and finished the quizzes, he or she completes the 50-question multiple choices end-of-course examination provided with each program. Answers sheets are submitted to UNITAR POCI for grading. If learners achieve a passing grade of 75%, they are awarded a Certificate-of-Completion for that individual program. UNITAR POCI presents the following programs:
2.3.5.1 An Introduction to the UN System: Orientation for Serving on a UN Field Mission
Learners gain a solid introductory foundation in the workings and structure of the UN and UN initiatives to support peace. Topics include the task and mission organisation, the principal organs of the UN, the UN’s role in maintaining peace and security, the UN’s role in the fields of development and related humanitarian actions, the environments, principles of duties and responsibilities, safety and security, the available tools, and the institutional partners involved in peacekeeping (Hårleman, 2003: 1-185).
2.3.5.2 History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations during the Cold War: 1945 to 1987
The program provides learners with an understanding of the genesis, origin, and evolution of UN Peacekeeping and the background of the UN Charter. It covers the Arab-Israeli conflict and peacekeeping missions in Korea, Lebanon, the Congo, India and Pakistan, the Middle East, Cyprus, and Africa. The program discusses military peacekeeping as a means to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes (Liu, 1999: 1-123).
2.3.5.3 History of United Nations Peacekeeping operations following the Cold War: 1988 to 1997
This course discusses the political and diplomatic background and the perspectives that shaped UN peacekeeping during a period when superpower rivalry ended and the community of nations sought to form a new world order, with UN peacekeeping playing a central role. It traces UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement during the years following the Cold War: The Persian Gulf, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Mozambique, Angola, Cambodia and Central America (Liu, 1998:5-195).
2.3.5.4 Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia: From the Dayton Accord to Kosovo
Since the conclusion of the Cold War the United Nations have been called upon to intervene in more conflicts and keep the peace in more places than in the previous 45 years since the UN has been established. This expansion in the size, scope and complexity of PK operations has been exemplified by the events that occurred in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. The program familiarizes the learner with the military and political efforts to bring peace to the Former Yugoslavia 1995-1999. It discusses the historical background, the Dayton Accord, UN missions prior to IFOR, SFOR, NATO, The Kosovo Crisis, the KLA and the JLA, the role of the media, missions completed and ongoing. This theater of operations has been one of the UN’s greatest challenges in the new realms of peace making, peace enforcement, peace building, as well as traditional and second generation PK operations. (Ram and Juyal, 1999: 1-278).
2.3.5.5 Global Terrorism
This learning program reflects the events of September 11, 2001 and emerging details of the global phenomenon of terrorism. Topics included are: origins of contemporary terrorism, domestic, international and transnational terrorism, guerilla warfare and the Geneva conventions, war crimes and crimes against humanity, terrorism and human rights violations, proclaimed motivations and justifications, profile, structure and practice of terrorist organisations, terrorist’s weapons, improvised explosive devices (IED), nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, suicide terrorists, mutilation, ethnic cleansing, structure destruction, hijacking, kidnapping, hostages, nuclear terrorism, new religious terrorism, counter-terrorism, special police formations, Al Qa'ida attacks on the USA, UN resolutions and instruments against terrorism, political integrity and will to counter terrorism. The program also includes case studies, a glossary, extracts from security in the field, statistics of death, injury and hostage taking in UN missions, as well as a list of useful security and related publications (Medhurst, 2002:1-575).
2.3.5.6 Principles for the Conduct of Peace Support Operations
Peacekeepers need to be guided by deep understanding of UN organisations and principles. In order to operate in the mission efficiently and effectively, they should have a clear picture of the background, functions and, in particular, the role of the UN in PK activities.
The peacekeepers should also be capable of interoperating in a conflict or post-conflict area within a multinational and multidisciplinary environment, respectful of different cultures and professional ethics and able to avoid conflict-escalation while ready to cope with it (Standard Generic Training Module 1B, 2003:1).
Learners learn the operational applications and political implications of the full range of PSO’s in today’s complex environment. Conceptual approaches, principles, operational techniques, PK, PE, peace support, combat, the promotion of consent, and planning for peace operations (Wilkinson, 1996:1-191).
2.3.5.7 The Conduct of Humanitarian Relief Operations
Learners learn how humanitarian relief is provided to refugees and victims of war and natural disasters. Topics include a history of humanitarian relief, the development of humanitarian action in the 20th century, international humanitarian organizations, specialized government structures, NGOs, the Red Cross, principles of intervention, respect for at-risk populations including women and children, international humanitarian law, management of humanitarian emergencies, population security and safety, managing a refugee camp, community health care in humanitarian intervention, control of communicable diseases and epidemics, relief convoys, shelter, distribution of food aid, water management, collective sanitation, sustainable solutions to humanitarian crises, freely consented repatriation, asylum, conducting elections, establishment of civil institutions, the humanitarian charter, minimum standards for disaster relief, code of conduct in rescue and disaster situations (Conoir, 2002: 1-228).

2.3.5.8 Serving as a United Nations Military Observer: Methods and Techniques
The content of this course is consistent with the methods and practices of UN Peacekeeping that have been established over the past 50 years. Much of the material in this course is based on the UN military observers manual. The student should refer to appropriate policy documents and other authoritative sources when serving on a UN observer mission. How to serve as a UN military observer (MILOBS), dealing with culture shock and understanding social customs: MILOBS duties on patrols and observer posts, the code of conduct, impartiality, liaison, negotiation, communication and security are aspects dealt with (Hårleman, 1997: 1-169).
2.3.5.9 Security Measures for United Nations Peacekeepers
Peacekeepers are finding themselves in more diversified security environments than ever before. It is critical that all have a clear understanding of basic security awareness principles and responsibilities to ensure that they can effectively perform their duties. Considerations for security at the residence, while engaged in walking or jogging, preparation for travelling both internationally or internally in the country of assignment, what to do in the event of a breakdown, accident, ambush or car hijacking, are provided to better prepare the peacekeeper for the daily threats he/she may encounter (Standard Generic Training Module 06, 2003:1).
This program follows in the wake of September 2001. Although this learning program does not deal specifically with aviation security and national defence, its syllabus encompasses several aspects of security concerning terrorism, useful on the individual scale, especially for UN Peacekeepers and those deployed under field conditions, for which this course is purposely designed. This learning program prepares military and civilian personnel for inevitable security problems on any UN mission. Topics include security defined, security in UN missions, security in the mandate, HQ security, bases, checkpoints, vehicles, communications, weapons, defense, diplomatic and envoy status, assault, rape, hostage-taking, terrorist bombing, ambushes and blackmail. It also includes case studies, a glossary, field extracts, statistics of death and injury and hostage taking in UN missions (Medhurst, 2002: 1-247).
2.3.5.10 Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution
This program is aimed at anyone working in a zone of conflict. As such, the program may be useful to both military and civilian representatives of the international peacekeeping community. Given the complexity and diversity of contemporary conflicts, and the range of actors involved in trying to create and sustain peace in war-torn societies, it does not intend to provide the student with a prescription for resolving the world’s conflicts. As no two conflicts are identical, effective conflict intervention requires understanding, flexibility and creativity. The program offers the learner a broad understanding of the fundamental concepts, principles and techniques of conflict resolution that may be applied in a variety of contexts and on a number of different levels. It seeks to provide the learner with some of the conceptual, analytical and practical tools that will allow him or her to understand and operate more effectively in peacekeeping environments (Woodhouse and Duffey, 2000:1-239).


2.3.5.11 Commanding United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
This course prepares commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) to lead their troops on peacekeeping operations. Students learn the military, institutional and legal background to PK. Organisation of command, methods of command, rules of engagement, principles, operational techniques, action and the use and non-use of deadly force is included in learning material. How peacekeepers conduct observation posts, patrols, convoys, escorts and refugee and humanitarian operations is briefly discussed. Support of diplomatic initiatives, prisoner exchanges, protecting civilians, dealing with parties in conflict and humanitarian agencies are conversed (Faure, 1996:1-165).
2.3.5.12 United Nations Civilian Police: Restoring Order Following Hostilities
Most experts agree that the role of the United Nations Civil Police (UN CIVPOL) is crucial to the success of post-Cold War peace operations. Working closely with military peacekeepers and observers, CIVPOL are a key resource in re-establishing a “rule of law” necessary for all other government institutions to function properly and for economic activity and “peace building” to take place. In order to execute this important job, CIVPOL observers must be trained. This program familiarises the learner with the roles and duties of UN CIVPOL in restoring civil order following chaos. Topics include the history of CIVPOL, privileges and immunities, cultural relations, staff duties and reporting, communications, safety, principles, liaison, negotiation and security (Forster, 1997:1-203).

2.3.5.13 Mine Action: Humanitarian Impact, Technical Aspects and Global Initiative
In this learning program the learner is introduced to the global problem of landmines and how international organisations are approaching the problem. The topics include The anti-personnel mine ban treaty (Ottawa MBT), mine action guidelines for ceasefires and peace agreements, landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) safety training, identifying landmines and UXOs, international mine action standards (IMAS) and guidelines for application, victim assistance, and mine risk education. Even when the hostilities of war are long past, these devices represent a lingering cruelty and an obstacle to recovery. It is this problem and cruelty that the authors of this program and others seek to confront. By studying the lessons of this program the learner will see what measures organisations and the international community are taking. The learner will also learn which contributions remain to be made (Donoghue and Wilkinson, 2003: 1-293).
2.3.5.14 International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict
This high level program covers international humanitarian law (IHL) as applied to soldiers, humanitarian workers, refugees, displaced persons and others involved with armed conflict. Topics include background and definitions, protection of victims, rights of prisoners of war, rules of conduct in hostilities, means of implementation, human rights and IHL, applicability of IHL to PK and PE, different applications to inter-national and intra-national conflicts, terrorism, sovereignty and the role of the International Red Cross (IRC) in IHL (Bouvier, 2000:1-187).

2.3.5.15 Logistical Support to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
For the future peacekeepers working in their national environment in their mother country, logistics seldom creates problems. Serving in a UN mission may not be very different, but if the peacekeepers deploy to a mission just being established, they may face some hardships. All the facilities mentioned in their own country have to be established in the mission area and this is usually a shared responsibility between the UN and the troop contributing country (TCC). UN operations are rather complex with respect to logistic support. No two missions are the same, as the support to the UN from host nations, troop contributing countries and contractors differs (Standard Generic Training Module 15, 2003:1).
This learning program introduces students to logistics operations in UN peace operations. It gives the background and rationale behind UN PK logistics, the strategy employed in the field and at Headquarters (HQ), introduces the mission life-cycle, explains how financial support is gained and introduces the different components that make up integrated logistics support in a field mission (Baig, 2002:1-265).
2.3.5.16 Operational Logistical Support of UN Peacekeeping Missions
UN missions can vary in size from a small group of observers who may be civilians, police, military or a mixture, to a combined operation of land, sea and air forces involving tens of thousands of personnel. Consequently, various logistic concepts will need to be considered to fulfill a mission's logistic requirements.

This program provides the learner with a background in intermediate-level topics of UN operational logistics. Topics include an overview of UN operational logistics, command and control, planning, supply, engineering support, fire protection, environmental measures, transportation, aviation and air services, maintenance, medical aspects of logistical support, communications, as well as postal and courier services (Leslie, 1999: 1-201).
2.4 CONCLUSION
Peace and security issues have become priority issues, not only for the African continent, but also for the international community. The importance of the peace and security design is associated with a number of different factors. The creation of the AU must be seen as a step of crucial importance in the development of peace on the African continent.
In connection with some positive developments at regional level and with the NEPAD initiative, the AU is now seen as constituting a realistic “African reform program” designed to set new African political accents, and at the same time to consciously seek support from abroad.
The dynamics developed by African reform efforts have been accompanied by an altered outside perception of Africa’s growing significance to international politics. Apart from the global security perspective, Africa is currently experiencing a geo-strategic renaissance. Some African regions are becoming important world oil suppliers. The USA, as well as other countries such as China, is increasingly coming to view parts of the continent from an angle of energy security.
Against the background of Africa’s dynamics and new security agenda, external actors are adapting their instruments and rethinking their options. After a series of disappointing peace missions in the 1990s (particularly in Angola, Rwanda, Somalia and Liberia), the UN Security Council has begun to renew its peace efforts in Africa (Burundi, Cote d’ Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia, for example).
Increasingly cross-cutting approaches are being sought that integrate elements from the fields of foreign policy, security and development policy. Interfaces and overlaps between civil and military spheres have grown at pace. The African continent has increasingly become the focal point of UN peacekeeping missions after the low ebb of the 1990s.
Peace missions call for a focus on comprehensive approaches, involving sufficient civil components (developmental peacekeeping) with the inherent challenge for sufficient post-conflict peace-building funding and capital.
The ownership and political leadership of external civil and military interventions must lie with African institutions. Although the AU’s ownership approach to peace and security on the African continent is fundamentally correct, it is contradictory to the funding and implementation capacities that are available.
UN military missions, both small and large and under widely varying mandates, have been staffed by multinational peacekeeping forces composed mainly of military units and military personnel who have been trained through their own national programmes.
Although these missions require a large number of military specialists, the involvement of civilians has expanded significantly, particularly where a peacekeeping operation has been called upon to perform duties that are less military in nature.
The same tendency prevails in other areas of UN field operations such as the more peaceful development activities. All UN field missions require staffing by personnel with extensive professional training in their own field of expertise.
In addition, these staff members must have an awareness of the complex working environment, including political, economic, and social and security conditions in the field. They must also have knowledge of multidisciplinary structures, especially the UN system itself. Personnel have to acquire the ability to handle these intricate concerns. This requires a coherent and cohesive training system that covers training at all levels.
Self-paced correspondence courses, such as those of UNITAR POCI, should be regarded as part of such a system. It is primarily aimed at those who are or would like to become members of UN/AU field missions and who would like to become better familiarised with the UN, its system, working conditions and requirements in the field.
There is an emerging consensus on the need to prepare for coordination before conflicts arise. This preparation involves better training that gives the military an insight into the ways in which humanitarian workers operate and familiarises themselves with the military approach.
Knowing and respecting each other’s mandates can help prevent misunderstandings. Training is, moreover, a means of fostering predictability. This is very important for the military, for which the world of humanitarian action is one of perplexing diversity.
Training in advance also provides an additional opportunity to spread knowledge of international humanitarian law and especially its particular implications for peace-keeping operations among national troops.
Knowledge of the UN Secretary-General’s guidelines on international humanitarian law should be promoted, too, by the UN and by the governments themselves.
Military activity is but one element that has to integrate into the conduct of the overall campaign. The demands for comprehensive training are higher for peacekeeping operations than for war-fighting, particularly as the severity of extreme peace-support operations can equal, and even exceed, those of much war-fighting.
The diversity of tasks and sometimes their unexpected nature means that the training manuals cannot cope with every eventuality. This, in turn, implies that junior officers and NCOs may have to cope with situations drawing on inculcated values gained through education rather than proce­dures and tactics learned in training.
Education takes time and has to nurture. “Growing edu­cation” is a big concept and dependent on national education systems (Herrly, 2005: 1).
It is essential that personnel from all nations are guided by standard UN and AU approved operating procedures and that training is available to familiarise personnel with established doctrine. Such training must be standard, doctrinally correct, easily delivered to personnel of all nations, up-to-date and inexpensive.
Since the nature of PK on the African continent is comprehensive and complex, the importance of training is more evident, underscoring the urgent need for the AU to have a well-trained and prepared ASF participating in its various operations.
Since the attitudes, tactics and methods of peacekeeping operations diverge from conventional military doctrines, efforts must be taken to improve understanding of peacekeeping principles and techniques.
The proposed Model of Co-operative Education on PSO in Africa will assist in training peacekeepers by enhancing the general understanding of PK and providing specific knowledge of methods for serving on peace missions. The demands being made on PK and the multifaceted character of contemporary operations call for greater attention to be paid to the training and preparation of anyone involved in a PK operation.