A PERSPECTIVE – SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE (SANDF) PARTICIPATION IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN AFRICA By Dr PJ de Montfort and Dr KJ de Beer ABSTRACT South Africa is since 1994 a respected member of the international community, and as such it is expected to participate in the peace drive in Africa. This chapter attempts to give a perspective on the role of the SANDF in conflict peacekeeping in Africa and was informed by a variety of sources covering the period 1994 to 2008. Here some of the reasons for conflict on the continent are discussed followed by the view that South Africa has on deployments of its armed forces in support of peacekeeping in Africa. Next there is an outline of some of the current operations that the SANDF is involved in. This is followed by a discussion of the capabilities and ability of the SANDF to sustain conflict peacekeeping operations over long periods. In conclusion there is realisation that South Africa will have to continue deploying in regional operations if it is to be taken seriously in its leadership role on the continent. The SANDF contribution to the African Standby Force (ASF) to fulfil the African Union’s (AU) peacekeeping ambitions will depend heavily on South Africa as the economic powerhouse on the continent. The political level must realise that if it wants the SANDF to play the lead nation role in Africa, it must release more funds to it. Open and Distance E-Learning (ODEL) modes with Open Education Resources (OER) of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) in Geneva have inter alia been researched, however, the core training facet is based on cooperative education methodologies. INTRODUCTION In 1945, the United Nations (UN) formed to maintain international peace and security. South Africa became a member of the organisation, committing itself to the international ideal of maintaining world peace. Accordingly, South Africa participated in the peace drive since the late forties. Its involvement in the Berlin Air Bridge in 1948 as well as in the war in Korea in 1951 is an example of this. Nevertheless, since the 1950's the apartheid policy and South African involvement in Namibia alienated South Africa from the international community. Consequently, South Africa missed nearly fifty years of peace support experience. Since the 1994, with democratic change in South Africa, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has been more constructively involved in Africa. The SANDF provided election assistance in the form of air transport for UNAVEM II in Angola and ONUMOZ in Mozambique, as well as logistic support for UNAVEM III at the UN assembly areas in Angola. Engineers assisted the Angolan government with the training of de-mining teams. Over the years, the SANDF has contributed humanitarian aid to several disaster stricken areas such as Malawi, Mozambique and Angola. Although these operations were not peace support operations in the strictest sense of the word, they provided practical support value and symbolic goodwill value, for they showed that South Africa was committed to peaceful co-operation and development in the African context (SANDF Command Information Section, 2004). AIM The aim of this paper is to give a perspective on the role of South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in conflict peacekeeping in Africa. Conflict in Africa and the view of South Africa on Peacekeeping in Africa The majority of Africa wars, which is unconventional, can best be described as intra-state, ethno-political and or criminal conflicts. This has become the trend since African states such as Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Angola, Namibia has involved themselves in armed conflicts beyond their borders. These foreign interventions have also involved financing, supply of arms from external sources and the use private security companies (Harkavy and Neuman, 2001). Conflict remains a characteristic of sub-Saharan Africa and various factors have a continued influence on the conflict potential in the region. Some of these factors include: poverty and underdevelopment, scarcity of and competition for resources, refugees and illegal immigrants, illegal firearms, diseases such as HIV/AIDS, cholera, malaria etc, Africa continues to have weak states which is often the result of colonialism, corruption in government, abuse of power, poor accountability and mismanagement, ethnic conflict and religious intolerance (Krizinger, 2005). The security of Africa has deteriorated since 1989, when the Cold War ended. Insurgents often gained power and some states involved themselves militarily in their neighbour’s affairs. Diminished foreign interest, a change in the nature of African conflicts and personal dictatorial rule in many African states have been causes of deterioration. Many African wars are rooted in ethnic quarrel (Kruys, 2004). In addition, the end of the Cold War reduced the military-strategic importance of Africa in world politics and increased claims for democracy encouraged civil conflict in various African nations. A high proportion of youth, rapid urban growth, low levels of cropland and excessive adult mortality, mostly due to high HIV and AIDS prevalence, are further factors increasing risks levels for civil conflict (Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion, 2003). Africa has emerged as a dangerous and challenging environment for the conduct of peace operations (Potgieter, 1996). The challenges and constraints of peacekeeping in African countries such as Somalia and Rwanda led to unwillingness by the major powers to become involved in peacekeeping efforts in Africa (Neethling, 1999). At the start of the 21st century Africa is unstable and rent by wars leading to famine, brutality, disease and failing economies. There exists no doubt that Africa is brimming with poverty and underdevelopment. Africa has the lowest per capita income in the world (Daniels, 2005). This state of affairs led to calls made by President Thabo Mbeki for an Africa-renaissance that amounts to Africans accepting responsibility for their own destiny (Steyn, 1997) and accountability for conflict prevention and resolution on the continent through co-operation at regional and sub-regional level (Thiart, 1997). Nelson Mandela put forward the national value: “South Africa cannot escape its African destiny” (Mandela, 1993). Corresponding to calls for a renaissance the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is arguable the most important socio-economic plan ever to emerge from Africa - an ‘African solution to African problems.’ The programme links aid to good governance and set preconditions for its success to include peace and security (Ramsbotham, Bah and Calder, 2005). If NEPAD is to be viable, the role of African militaries will have to be acknowledged and defined (Engelbrecht, 2002). In reaction, the African Union (AU) proposed the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF) and the G8 countries have pledged assistance to African peacekeeping efforts as part of their Africa action plan to support NEPAD (Fabricius, 2003). South Africa has declared itself willing to contribute to PSO under the auspices of the UN, the AU and Southern African development Community (SADC) (Kent and Malan: 2003). The White Paper on Defence (1996) acknowledges the expectation for South Africa to participate in PSO. The Defence Review (1998) stipulates that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) may become involved in PSO as part of a multinational peace force. In January 2001, President Thabo Mbeki told the world economic forum at Davos that the key priority for Africa was creating peace, security, stability, and democratic governance, as without which it would be impossible to engage in meaningful economic activity. Former South African Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota agrees that there can be no development without security (Heitman, 2005b). In an interview with Helmoed-Römer Heitman, the Chief of the South African (SA) Army, Lt Gen Solly Shoke, made it clear that it was the SANDF’s duty to participate in conflict peacekeeping in Africa. The strong national interest and experience in the peaceful resolution of its own complicated conflict compels South Africa to participate in peace missions to alleviate the plight of other peoples who are struggling to resolve similar conflicts. Situations may arise in Southern Africa where inter- or intra-state conflict poses a threat to peace and stability in the region. If political efforts to resolve the conflict are unsuccessful, it may become necessary to deploy the SANDF in multi-national peace support operations on the African continent (ISS: 2006). SANDF Deployments in Support of Conflict Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1994, South Africa has seen an increase in pressure for to become involved in the United Nations driven conflict prevention initiatives in Africa (Department of Defence, 1998). The nature of UN peacekeeping missions in certain African countries has led to an increasing reluctance on the part of the major powers to deploy on African soil. Africa needs to accept responsibility for conflict prevention and resolution on the continent through co-operation at the sub-regional level (Thiart, 1997). Since 1998 the SANDF has played a leading role in this regard. Currently, in 2008, the SANDF has in the order of 3,000 troops deployed on various United Nations (UN) / African Union (AU) peacekeeping missions: Burundi (900), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (1,350), Cote d’ Ivoire (38) and Sudan (318). Another approximately 1,500 troops are deployed domestically, primarily to assist the South African Police Service (SAPS) in fighting crime. The government also approved additional SANDF deployments to UN/AU missions in Uganda, Eritrea/Ethiopia and Nepal (IRIN, 2008). While the SANDF have been seriously involved in the security initiatives of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), it has also been part of the broader continental security structure of the AU. In 1998 the SANDF sent troops into Lesotho on an operation, code named Operation Boleas, to prevent a military coup after an election dispute. The poorly managed operation raised doubts internationally about South Africa’s military competence. Operation Boleas suggested that the SANDF was not properly trained and equipped for a peacekeeping operation which rapidly changed to a peace enforcement mission. The most significant AU operation that the SANDF has been part off thus far is the African Mission to Burundi (AMIB). Initially, in 2001, the SANDF was sent to the ethnically divided nation to protect opposition politicians during the peace process. However as the situation become less stable, a broader contingent of AU troops was brought in to keep the peace. Burundi is a largely successful operation for the AU, though disorder in the DRC creates challenges for the country, the peace has generally held. However, according to The AU Monitor of 27 Dec 2008 the Liberation of the Hutu People/National Liberation Front are yet to join the regional peace initiative. Drastic measures are asked for against any Burundian side that further stalls the full implementation of the 7 Sept 06 ceasefire deal. Tension between warring parties have increased anxiety giving rise to public suspicion of fresh clashes like those that took place in Apr 07, killing 100 and leaving thousands displaced. Another AU operation the SANDF has become involved in is the African Mission to Sudan (AMIS). The operation is aimed at keeping order while a settlement is negotiated in the Darfur region. This operation has faced enormous difficulty in obtaining both funding and international logistic support. The conflict in Sudan consists basically of an insurgency on the part of the non-Islamic south, against an Islamic-based central government in Khartoum. The government has control over the main towns in the south while the rebels control the rural areas. This war has a decidedly ethic character involving an Arabic north against a black south reinforced by an Islamic-Christian religious divide. It is estimated that more than one million military and civilian deaths have resulted from fighting, massacres and starvation. Long-standing hostilities of an ethnic nature have a tendency to smoulder, erupt and smoulder again almost indefinitely. Against better judgement the SANDF got involved so far north involving Arabic Africa. This is unfortunate as ethnic conflicts which have escalated to the level of semi-conventional battles with tanks and artillery requires more force to end than South Africa can afford (Kruys, 2004). The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has involved seven nations. There have been a number of complex reasons, including conflicts over basic resources such as water, access and control over rich minerals and other resources and various political agendas. This has been fuelled and supported by various national and international corporations and other regimes which have an interest in the outcome of the conflict (Shah, 2008). This is one of the deadliest in African history. Ethnic tensions in eastern DRC arise out of the region’s position as a meeting point of the Congolese and Rwandan/Burundian ethnic groups. Interethnic conflicts were historically fought over political power and land rights in the Kivus. A massive influx of refuges into the DRC after the 1994 Rwandan genocide exacerbated tensions leading to a regional war. Since it begun in August 1998, it is estimated that the fighting and its aftermath (poverty, disease and malnutrition) have claimed nearly 5.4 million lives. More than 1.3 million people is currently displaced form their homes in the east. There is rampant gender-based violence and recruitment of child soldiers. Now, even despite the signing of several peace accords, and the presence of the world’s largest United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force, MONUC, with over 18,000 troops in the theatre, the violence continues. An UN-brokered ceasefire signed in January 2008 has been consistently violated by both the Congolese army and the ethnic Tutsi rebels led by General Laurent Nkunda. The FDLR, extremist Hutu militia made up of former Rwandan genocidaires, also remain at large in the eastern DRC. A resurgence of fighting between the Congolese army and Nkunda’s forces beginning in August 2008 has claimed an unknown number of lives and left thousands displaced. Growing tensions could provoke another regional war (Stand, 2008). The UN is working on obtaining an amendment to the UN peacekeeping regulations, chapter 7, to allow UN peacekeepers (MONUC) there to use force, against the rebels and tackling the root causes of the conflict. SANDF forces have been involved since 1999, in liaison activities, monitoring the “cease-fire” and the disengagement, disarmament, reintegration, rehabilitation and repatriation in the eastern DRC. Infantry, logistics, medical and engineering personnel are deployed. 2008 was also a year of several other challenges for Africa. In the beginning of the year, more than 1500 people died and thousands were injured during violence following the elections in Kenya. In the horn of Africa, Somalian pirates carried out various attacks on shipping hijacking more than 100 vessels. Currently there is 13 vessels with their crew being held hostage by Somalia’s, waiting for their ransom money. On the Ugandan border with the Central African Republic the so-called Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) carried out a raid on a town and kidnapped a group of children. The aim of this raid was to use the children as sex slaves and child soldiers against the Kampala government. In Nigeria two French diplomats was kidnapped. In Zimbabwe 1000 people died of Cholera, 18,000 people have cholera and 80,000 more is vulnerable. Still there is no power sharing government and no end in sight to the ongoing political conflict in that country. In South Africa there was Xenophobic attacks displacing thousand of foreigners (Die Burger, 17 Dec 2008). How well equipped is the SANDF to deal with Conflict Peacekeeping in Africa? The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), states that the primary object of the SANDF is to defend and protect the Republic. The first and primary role of the SANDF is defence against external aggression and it is for this core function that it is funded, structured, trained, and equipped. However it is for its secondary functions that the SANDF is most operational. The question arises whether the SANDF is adequately trained, equipped and prepared for operations other than war. To answer this question, challenges with regard to force preparation, force employment, and the sustainment of forces is discussed. An index published in the International Security Review is of the opinion that South Africa’s military potency is slipping (Trench, 1998). According to Heitman (2003), an army lives and dies literally by its training. Soldiers, units and formations must train frequently, regularly and thoroughly for an army to be effective. Any slippage in the training programme will eventually result in casualties. In preparing its forces for peace support missions, the SANDF rely almost exclusively on a core of general-purpose combat training, supplemented by mission-specific training during the pre-deployment phase. The reliance on general-purpose combat training base on the conviction that troops well trained for high-intensity warfare would be well prepared for any scenario falling short of combat, including peacekeeping. It assumes that peacekeeping draw on the same set of skills as conventional warfare, but test soldiers to a lesser degree. It assumes that any necessary training beyond general-purpose combat training is achievable within the relatively short period between the notice of mission and a unit's actual deployment. Unfortunately, this traditional approach to training is not adequate to give military personnel either the full range of skills or the appropriate orientation necessary to meet the diverse and complex challenges presented in African peace support operations. The topics relevant to training for peace support operations are numerous and complex, and could not be covered adequately in the pre-deployment phase, particularly in cases where that period is measured in days. The failure of the formal training plan to provide adequately for these non-combat skills arise primarily from the lack of doctrine recognising the need for such training, and the lack of supporting training materials and standards. Peacekeepers must be acquainted with the political, military, and socio-cultural dynamics of the crisis area. This discussion indicates that there is a lack of education, training, and development opportunities in South Africa concerning peace support operations. Allen (1998) says that training is fundamental in becoming more productive. As a result, to succeed the SANDF, other government and non-government organisations (NGOs) involved in PSO have no other alternative but to properly educate, train and develop its people (SA White Paper on Defence, 1996). By using ETD as force multiplier, the SANDF will be able to meet future force demands (Van der Westhuizen, 1998). Back in 1994, it looked as if the future role of the SANDF was to be a ‘self-defence’ force, restricted to the defence of home territory. Today, in striking contrast, the SANDF finds itself operating far from home (average of 3 500 km), in the DRC, Burundi and the Darfur region of Sudan. In the near future it is expected that the SANDF will have some 4 500 troops deployed outside the RSA. Although not combat operations, peacekeeping far from home imposes many of the same demands, in terms of logistics, medical support, command and control. Between Feb 2000 and the end of 2006, the UN mission in the DRC, Monuc – in which SANDF troops are participating – suffered 96 casualties. Since 2005 Monuc undertook a number of combat operations against the rebel forces in the eastern DRC, using ground forces supported by attack helicopters. Peacekeeping, is thus, not operations without the risk of combat, and can change from a peacekeeping effort to one of peace enforcement overnight (Campbell, 2007). Jankielsohn (2003), a member of parliament, urged government to acknowledge that the SANDF has a limited capacity to deploy troops in PSO over long periods. It has neither the logistical nor the personnel capacity to do so. According to Boshoff (Financial Mail, 2004) SANDF resources is stretched to the limit by its peacekeeping obligations, prompting a review of policy. Other key challenges in the SANDF is observable: figures disclosed in the defence annual report indicate that the defence force has a vacancy rate of 15%, but a vacancy as high as 40% in key areas. There is a 30% shortage of combat-ready soldiers. The report noted that 6 700 people left the SANDF in 2007/08, with 1660 having departed form critical occupations. Skilled staff leaving the SANDF poses a serious threat to the security of the country and prolonged participation in peacekeeping operations abroad. The SA air force (SAAF) is losing pilots and technical specialists in droves. The SA Navy is losing sailors, divers, submariners and navy engineers, leaving for higher wages. The SA Army is losing intelligence personnel, air defence artillery and artillery specialists (Helfrich: 2008). The policy of affirmative action has impacted on this situation, as it leads to juniors being appointed in positions way above their ceiling. The exodus of skilled staff, leave only a handful of experienced personnel to guide and mentor the rest who have limited or no combat experience. According to Heitman (2003) the SA Air Force (SAAF) does not have enough strategic lift capability for the rapid deployment of a credible force, to sustain it, and, should it become necessary to quickly extract it. The SAAF has so few fighter aircraft that its ability to deploy a credible minimum number for a sustained basis in support of operations far away from the RSA is doubtful. The shortage of attack helicopters is even worse, with currently only 12 “Rooivalk” in service. The SAAF does not have big transport helicopters such as the American Chinook. The SA Navy (SAN) does not have enough sealift capability to deploy the equipment of a credible force, and in spite of the delivery of the new corvettes does not have enough combat vessels to support operations in coastal areas such off the coast of Somalia to stem piracy. The SA Army faces particular challenges because it now has to prepare for operations in new and unfamiliar environments. The Army has to be able to operate in built-up areas in Africa, including in informal settlements. The Army has no experience of jungle or mountain warfare. The Army’s current Infantry Fighting Vehicle (ICV), the Ratel and Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) the Casspir, remains vulnerable to man-portable anti armour weapons. Such vulnerabilities are serious because peacekeeping forces generally allow the other side to fire first and only then return fire (Campbell, 2007). Logistical weaknesses, amongst others, are that the SANDF’s war reserves are at depleted levels and stock level planning of operational reserves including medical logistical support are lacking. The vehicles and equipment of most combat units show signs of ageing and is at a low serviceability status. There are communication and signal weaknesses, such as the lack of sufficient training in the use of signal equipment and radio communications (Kruys, 2004). A key issue in respect of the SA Army is the rotation of troops. One cannot deploy troops and just leave them. They have to come back for training and they have to spend time with their families. The SANDF’s present rotation of six months in 24 is not sustainable – it will destroy the training programme, and leave the force ill-prepared for conventional and peacekeeping operations alike. For the better part of a decade the SANDF has not been able to train properly, to maintain its equipment properly, or to maintain its infrastructure (Heitman, 2005b). HIV/AIDS constitute the biggest threat to its deployment potential and operational effectiveness – up to 25% of SANDF employees are thought to be HIV-positive. As a result, the challenge faced in terms of mission-ready battalions is ‘fitness’. Health issues have had a considerable impact on the force. As a result, battalions have had to be constituted of personnel from different units so as to reach force strength. Often these newly formed battalions do not have sufficient time to train together before deployment on peace missions, weakening their ability to function as an integrated force (Accord, 2007). A serious backlog of equipment maintenance is another stumbling block. The experience of MONUC shows that several UN inspection teams declared the SANDF contingent to be at insufficient force readiness. The standard of training, discipline and equipment has turned out to be not much better than troops from the other African contributors. This correlates badly with the government’s stated political ambitions of wanting to make a significant and meaningful contribution and thus make a difference, i.e. being an example for others to follow. The forces in the DRC have been deployed with equipment that several UN inspections have declared ‘non-operational’ and vital strategic components have not been made available. It indicates that the stated political commitment is not being followed by actual commitment on the ground. South Africa cannot take on its responsibility as a lead nation with relatively weak African partners without the capacity to keep its own equipment in good working order. The low levels of operational readiness also mean that South Africa does not receive any reimbursement for the malfunctioning equipment, putting even more pressure on the already stretched resources of the SANDF (Mandrup, 2007). Also, the SANDF has a force cultural problem in the sense that its forces on deployment have so far exhibited an extremely poor disciplinary record. There has been an increased focus on this particular area due to sexual abuse investigations, especially in MONUC. This is a command and control issue, one that the SANDF leadership must take much more seriously. The behaviour of South African troops, especially off duty in both Burundi and the DRC, has been a problem to South Africa and has given the force a bad reputation. This need to be remedied to create the impression of a professional and capable force, one that can function properly and has the capacity to function as a representative of South Africa (Mandrup: 2007). The SANDF, increasingly challenged to cover more peacekeeping and domestic duties without a corresponding budget increase, is letting its willingness outrun its capacity (Heitman, 2005b). South Africa’s defence budget has consistently been reduced and is projected to fall to 1.2 percent of GDP in 2009. An additional financial issue is that when the UN reimburses South Africa for peacekeeping missions, the funds go to the Ministry of Finance and are not necessarily paid over to the SANDF for its expenditures (IRIN, 2008). According to Buur et al. (2007:840) even though South Africa is considered to be a regional power, the SANDF has been unable to live to the expectation that leaders in the Monuc HQ had before hand. In essence the SANDF involvement in the DRC indicates that South Africa, in its current state and condition does not possess the capacity to act as a lead nation for future Africa headed peace operations. Currently the RSA is handling its immediate commitments, but there is no doubt that the SANDF will not be able to sustain those deployments over the log run or take on any other extended large scale mission. It is thus debatable to what extent South Africa should be involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa. The country has large-scale unemployment, widespread poverty, poor border control, soaring inflation, high food prices, and a high crime rate as major problems. CONCLUSION The purpose of this paper was to put into perspective the deployment of the SANDF in conflict peacekeeping in Africa. All of the above discussion considered, what then of the SANDF’S future regional security role? South Africa is by far the richest and most developed country in Africa, and the rest of the world will continue to expect that it take a lead in dealing with crises and conflicts on the African continent, including deploying forces for peacekeeping and, if necessary fighting UN-mandated combat operations. South Africa will have to continue deploying in regional operations if it is to be taken seriously in its leadership role on the continent. The SANDF contribution to the African Standby Force (ASF) to fulfil the African Union’s (AU) peacekeeping ambitions will depend heavily on South Africa, as it cannot urge regional defence and security co-operation and leave others to deploy all of the troops needed. The political level must realise that if it wants the SANDF to play the lead nation role in Africa, it must release more funds to it. According to Engelbrecht (2008) the defence budget should increase by at least 30% from the current R30 billion to R 42 billion in the 2011/12 financial year. Such an increase should assist the SANDF to achieve a credible force design. Taking a realistic view the SANDF should then be able to deploy and sustain at least a brigade (approximately 4000 troops) for an extended period, and still have the ability to respond to sudden but short-term crisis. Extra funding should be channelled into the “landward capability” meaning modernisation and renewal of SANDF elements mainly in support of peacekeeping operations. A strategic air- and sealift capability is very important if the SANDF want to project forces far away from home in countries such as the DRC and Burundi. Finally it is a fact that the SANDF will have to cooperate with often weak African or SADC partners, meaning that the demands on the South African contribution to peace and stability on the African Continent are likely to increase. Consequently, if South Africa wants to continue, or to more successfully intervene in peacekeeping operations, it should first attempt to address its challenges. The best solution, in that case, would be to provide its defence force with the funding it needs to train, equip, maintain and perform the operations to which it is assigned. If the SANDF is to be an effective and credible force, able to perform its tasks safely and with minimal risk, it must instigate the above measures. Real African solutions need to move beyond the deployment of African troops on the ground to having the capacity to conceptualise, formulate, fund, execute and evaluate peacekeeping missions without the intervention or assistance of foreign governments. 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