HISTORY OF RECENT MILITARY FACTS ABOUT THE FORMER SANDF
A PERSPECTIVE ON THE STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
OF THE FORMER SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE
Author: Major General JA (Bertus) Steenkamp
Co-worker: Dr Karel J De Beer
ABSTRACT
Military operations claimed many lives on both sides of the Revolutionary War/Armed Struggle in South Africa. Operations on both sides were based on the national and military strategies of the South African Government and the Revolutionary Forces. On the SA Defence Force side, both Permanent Force members, as well as National Service Men, lost their lives. MK, APLA and SWAPO lost some of their best cadre’s and comrades. This created hate and division. Every life is valuable, and the loss of colleagues, family members, friends and comrades, are today regretted. However, it is necessary to take cognizance of the actual experiences of those soldiers that provide some valuable insight into their respective psychological attitudes. A former Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan remarked in his submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Committee that the emotions generated by contact with enemy fire, the loss of comrades and the shock of land-mine detonations negatively influence the judgment of the most reasonable and rational individual. War, in whatever form, has a degrading effect on most civilest of men. Subsequently, when the new South African National Defence Force was established in the new political dispensation in 1994, former arch-foes accepted the new status quo in a spirit of reconciliation. This remarkable fact originates solely from battle experience and a mutual understanding of the circumstances of conflict on both sides.
1. INTRODUCTION
It is important to evaluate the strategies and operations of the South African Defence Force (SADF) against the time frame in which strategies were formulated, decision made and actions executed. It is easy to sit back today, in relative comfort and with plenty of time, and deliver judgment on the activities of the SADF and MK soldiers, or those who had to undertake the protection of the state, and having to do so under the most difficult and primitive circumstances. History has shown us that politicians in a politically overloaded atmosphere can more easily achieve reconciliation between military men from both sides, than. In many instances the soldier was required to make a split-second decision, based on his training and his evaluation of his security and the threat. Today we sit back and debate those decisions for hours.
We must guard against selective morality. During the Anglo-Boer War the British forces established concentration camps where innocent women and children were confined and where they died in their thousands, yet this action is not considered to be the precursor to Nazi concentration camps and is not commemorated annually as a crime against humanity. In evaluating the forces involved in the armed struggle in South Africa, it is important to approach the given situation with honesty and make a clear distinction between facts, propaganda and disinformation. Facts are undisputable truths.
The purpose of this paper is to describe the historical background to the SADF and to provide an insight into the situation prevailing in South Africa during the period of turmoil. This will be followed by an analysis of the National Strategy upon which the military strategy and operations of the SADF were based. The paper will conclude with an analysis of the propaganda, disinformation, accusations and blatant untruths aimed at the SADF during the so-called struggle years.
2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE
Since the late 1400’s explorers and traders sailed around the Cape of Good Hope but saw no need for a permanent presence at the foot of Africa. The first permanent European settlement was established in April 1652, when Jan van Riebeeck, as representative of the Dutch East India Company, established a halfway post providing produce to passing ships. A small garrison for local security was also stationed at the Cape. This force, however, proved to be too weak and in 1658 a burgher militia supplemented it. This militia gradually grew into the commando system, with mixed forces of burghers and regular soldiers operating in defence of the Cape settlement. In 1796 this force was further supplemented by a corps of indigenous people with the primary aim of deterring possible revolt on the part of the settlers. With the Great Trek the settlers took the commando system along with them, and this was to be the core of the military system of the two Boer Republics. (Bouch, 22) These commando’s, under their own burgher leaders, supported by two small artillery units, took on the British regular forces during the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). The best evidence of their abilities lies in the fact that some 20 000 mounted commando riflemen were able to keep 250 000 British troops fully occupied for three years. This history is well known (De La Rey, 1990, 25-33) With the British rule established in 1902 in the former Boer republics, the republican military system was abolished.
After unification in 1910 the question of a united defence force came forward, and in 1912, Act 13 of 1912 brought the Union Defence Force (UDF) into existence. The UDF relied heavily on the citizen warrior of one kind or another. For practical purposes there was hardly a standing force, barring a few regiments of the gendarmerie-style, a tiny army air component, called the South African Aviation Corps and a small number of professionals of the Permanent Force. (De la Rey, 25-30) The citizen soldiers who made up the entire combat component consisted of a number of Active Citizen Force (ACF) regiments which were organized for what would now be called conventional warfare; the usual support units and the Defence Rifle Associations (DRA), which were nothing other but a revival of the old-commando system. The UDF soon proved its worth when World War I broke out, followed by the 1914 Rebellion, the South West African campaign and the fighting in North and East Africa and in Europe. The period between the world wars saw the establishment of the Air Service (out of which the SA Air Force (SAAF) developed in 1920), and the SA Naval Force on 1 April 1922. During World War II the South African soldiers gave good account of themselves. After the war South African pilots assisted the allied forces in the “Berlin-airlift.” The SAAF and a small component from the SA Army were also involved in the Korean War. Shortly after World War II the DRA became the Rifle Commando’s and in 1951 a compulsory training clause for commando members was implemented for the first time in South Africa’s history. During the 1960’s the Cape Corps was re-activated, and the first non-white commissioned officers were appointed to the Permanent Force.
In 1957, Act 44 of 1957 superseded the old SA Defence Act of 1913. The designation of the UDF was changed to the South African Defence Force (SADF). A national service system was introduced, in terms of which all white males of a certain age were subject to universal full-time conscription for an initial period of nine months, which in 1967 became 12 months, and in 1977, 24 months. With this modus operandi South Africa followed an international trend, in which countries like the USA, Israel, Switzerland, Cuba, Republic of China, and even Angola had at one time or another a compulsory military service system (SANDF Nodal Point, 1997, 5-25). After the initial training a National Service Man (NSM) was posted to the Citizen Force, or commando units, where they were required to participate in a small number of annual refresher camps as well as a certain amount of non-continuous training in between. In 1992 the total strength of the Citizen Force in the SA Army was approximately 243 000, i.e 45% of army forces available for operations (SANDF Nodal point, 1997, 5-24).
3. ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SA DEFENCE FORCE:
In terms of the SA Constitution the supreme command of the SA Defence Force was first vested in the Prime Minister and later in the State President, while the Minister of Defence was the political head of the Department of Defence. It was the responsibility of the Minister of Defence to ensure that the department functioned within the SA government’s political goals. The SA Defence Force was a monolithic (one-commander) organization under the military command of the Chief of the SADF (CSADF). He was accountable to the Minister of Defence for implementing the South African Government’s defence policy.
According to Act 22 of 1957 (as amended) the main functions of the SADF entailed:
• The defence of the RSA.
• The prevention or suppression of terrorism.
• The prevention or suppression of internal unrest in the RSA.
• The preservation of life, health and property and the maintenance of essential services.
The duty to maintain law and order in co-operation with the SAP was added in 1972, with the inclusion of sections 3 (5) and (6) of the Act.
To execute these functions the SA Defence Force was organised into four Arms of the Service, namely the SA Army, the SA Air Force, the SA Navy and the SA Medical Services (SANDF Nodal Point, 1995, 40):
• The SA Army was responsible for the national safety of the RSA and South West Africa (Namibia) in Army context, i.e. for landward defence;
• The SA Air Force (SAAF) was responsible to provide an air capability for attaining the security objectives of the RSA;
• The SA Navy was responsible to defend the RSA against maritime threats and attacks, to support landward operations and to assist safeguarding the maritime assets; and
• The SA Medical Services was responsible for the provision of medical, psychological, welfare and other related support to the SADF.
It is important to comment on the term “command.” Command is the executive function of management and the giving of orders (tasking) along the command line to subordinate commanders until the lowest level of command is reached. Depending on the task/operation Chief of the SADF could appoint a specific commander for that task or operation. However, in his capacity as Chief of the SADF, he remained responsible. (De Beer, 2009)
4. STRATEGICAL DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE THREAD PERCEPTION
The World Wars, in which the SADF, through its predecessor, the Union Defence Force, participated as part of the Allied Forces, are commonly known as conventional wars. Military forces confronting each other in uniform characterize these wars and the ultimate aim is to win the war and impose the winner’s political will on the enemy. After World War II another type of war, known as Revolutionary War developed (Arnold, 1961, 7). Revolutionary War became the major form of conflict in the second part of the 20th century and can be described as a modern adaptation of a conventional war, with the progressive application of political, economic and psychological resources, combined with varying degrees of violence and military action. Basically, a Revolutionary War is the pursuit of a political aim of an inspired and organized group inside a country, by all means available. Soldiers in a Revolutionary War do not wear uniforms, and are part and parcel of the population/masses. Success is achieved through the creation of instability and political intolerability by means of a war of attrition, thus producing a climate of political collapse or acceptance of a negotiated solution. The political aim of the instigators can be achieved without necessarily defeating their military opponents on the battlefield. Strategically, Revolutionary War is directed by an indirect strategy, where the revolutionary forces assume the tactical offensive at selected times and in selected forms and places. Armed action is used, but on a lower scale, while psychological actions are the major thrust. Violence, terror, propaganda and intimidation are the key ingredients to promote fear and instability to ensure support and to mobilise the population. (De Beer, 2009)
For the successful conduct of this type of war the revolutionary forces need an ally that can supply them with weapons, training and further their cause in the international arena. Lenin, who stated that these revolutionary conflicts could only develop effectively “in direct association with the revolutionary struggle of our Soviet Union”, originally, defined the Soviet Union’s attitude to such conflicts (SADF Nodal Point, 1997, 1-3) During the Cold War this became an integral part of the Soviet Union’s strategy for promoting communism globally. This led to solidarity with liberation movements amongst the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America as collective action of international communist parties. (Kosukhin, 1989, 30-31)
POSITION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT
The South African Government perceived the threat posed by the Eastern block as real and allied itself with the West. In his submission to the TRC General Malan reiterated that the “threat was the expansion of Marxism by fomenting revolution in Southern Africa. Its aim was to overthrow the. …Governments in Southern Africa …”(Malan 1997,25). This perception of the threat was emphasized by the direct involvement of Russian and Cuban military personnel in Southern Africa. Russian aid to the MPLA (Angola) between 1974 and 1976 was estimated by Western military sources to have been in the region of 400 million US dollars and it grew to four billion dollars in 1987 (SANDF Nodal Point, 1997, 1-7) Known Cuban involvement in Africa dates back to 1965 when about 200 instructors were deployed in the Congo to train the MPLA for operations against the Portuguese in Angola. Their involvement in the Angolan conflict escalated from approximately 230 instructors in April 1975 to about 17 000 troops in March 1976. During the offensive against UNITA Cuban force levels increased to about 50 000 troops in December 1988 (SANDF Nodal Point, 1997, 1-7). On the other hand, the United States and other western countries provided aid to anti-communist movements. Up to 1975, the USA had covertly supplied an estimated 32 million US dollars worth in arms and other aid to the Liberation Movements in Angola (UNITA and the FNLA). (Hamman, 2001, 24-25) South Africa also supported the FNLA and UNITA in 1974/75 with the knowledge and support of the USA. However, in December 1975 the US Government suspended all support to the anti-Marxist liberation movements in Angola (Hamman, 2001, 24-25). Velthuizen, 1994,8)
In 1970 Mr P.W. Botha, the then Minister of Defence, reiterated that there was a global struggle between the forces of “communism on the one hand and the forces of stability, security and progress” on the other.” The perception of South Africa being “Moscow’s stepping stone to world conquest,” became the departure point for security related government policy. Therefore the aim of the SA Government was not only to counter the revolution in Africa, but also to halt the expansion of Soviet domination in Southern Africa (SANDF Nodal Point 1995, 4). Prime Minister P.W. Botha said in parliament that the onslaught exists in that there is, “under Marxist guidance, an onslaught on our institutions which, if they were to be destroyed, would cause chaos in this country” (SANDF Nodal Point, 1995, 6).
The SA Government saw the colonial governments in Angola, Rhodesia, and Mozambique as allies to counter “Soviet expansionism.” Therefore the SA government concluded defensive agreements with Portugal and Rhodesia. Units of the SA Police were dispatched to Rhodesia in September 1967: “…to fight against men who originally came from South Africa and were on their way back to commit terrorism in South Africa”( SANDF Nodal Point, 1995, 4). Of more practical importance was the fact that these states (Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia) formed an effective buffer against direct foreign intervention by force. The strategy was to keep the “defence line” as far as possible away from South Africa itself. (De Beer, 2009)
This situation changed drastically with the independence of Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique and the need to redefine a national strategy arose. In parliament it was stressed that the only counter-strategy with any hope of success against a total onslaught, was also a total strategy – total resistance would have to be offered, fragmentary and ad hoc efforts in any sphere would be futile and pointless. All national groups and inhabitants of the South African subcontinent would have to resist the onslaught on a national basis in all spheres. This total national strategy was described: “as the process of ensuring and maintaining the sovereignty of a state’s authority in a conflict situation … the conflict … demands interdepartmental and co-ordinated actions in all fields – military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, ideological and cultural.” (SANDF Nodal Point, 1995, 5). In March 1980, the Cabinet approved the first extensive national strategy, titled, Boek 1/Beleid: Die RSA se Belange en die RSA-Regering se Doel, Doelstellings en Beleid vir ordelike Regering (Book 1/Policy: The RSA’s Interests and the RSA Government’s Aim, Objectives and Policy for stability in Government). This document sets out the philosophy of the South African government. Arising from the threat analysis, the national aims, objectives and policy, the security goal was to ensure the security of South Africa against any threats. The strategy emphasized that the RSA had no aggressive intentions towards its neighbours, but that the RSA’s posture was of an offensive nature and would, through pro-active actions, ensure its national security.
5. THE NATIONAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
In order to ensure co-ordinated and integrated joint planning by all the Government Departments, the SA Government established, in terms of Act 64 of 1972, the State Security Council (SSC) and the National Management System (NMS) (SANDF Nodal Point, 1995 ; Malan 2006, 208). The SSC was a statutory Cabinet Committee with the function of advising the Government on the formulation of national policy and strategy, as well as the implementation of such policy and strategy (SANDF Nodal Point 1995, 9). The SSC was chaired by die Prime Minister and later the State President. It is important to note that the State Security Council Act only provided the SSC with an advisory function, and all recommendations and advice were referred to the Cabinet for ratification and/or further action (SANDF Nodal Point, 1995, 11).
In accordance with the national strategy a high degree of orchestration and co-ordination was required countrywide. Therefore, the National Security Management System, based on the national strategy of co-ordination between departments, was decentralized to regional level. A regional Joint Management Centrum (JCM) was established to ensure that all actions were directed at achieving the national goal. The different departments were responsible for the execution or implementation of their departmental line functions within the national strategy and regional planning. (De Beer, 2009)
6. STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
The security forces were the SA Government’s official instruments, created in terms of the SA Constitution, with the aim of protecting the sovereignty of the State, its territorial integrity and its people. The security forces, including the SADF, were the forces employed in countering the armed struggle. It was expected of them to maintain law and order and create a stable environment in which the RSA Government could bring about evolutionary change in the country.
In order to implement the government’s policy it was necessary for the SADF to adapt to the escalation and changes in the armed struggle. In this regard the independence of the so-called frontline states, Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique, as well as the escalation of the revolutionary climate in South Africa played a major role. The frontline states provided safe bases for the ANC cadre’s and other liberation forces. From 1976 onwards, Angola became the main training centre for the ANC with Lusaka as the main operational centre. After 1978 Mozambique became the pivot for armed action against the RSA with regional headquarters being established in Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho (SANDF Nodal Point, 1997, 1-12). SWAPO operated from bases in Angola.
The government of the RSA and the SADF were, however, determined not to loose the initiative in the immediate external or tactical area, thereby being forced onto a defensive position. The lengthy borders, as well as the extent and isolation of the border areas, made it impossible to rely solely on a defensive posture. There would never have been enough military manpower to protect the population and infrastructure in all areas. Therefore the support for UNITA (Angola) and RENAMO (Mozambique) in the seventies and the eighties formed an integral part of the SADF military strategy. The support for UNITA included humanitarian aid, military support and financial support. UNITA operations were most of the time exaggerated and blamed on the South Africans (Steenkamp 1989, 212).
The Angolan Government allowed SWAPO insurgents and ANC cadre’s to operate from Angolan territory, and SADF directed several operations aimed at pre-empting planned actions. There is a belief that hundreds of external operations took place, but formal, deliberate and planned external operations are probably numbered less than a dozen. Most external operations (Namibia/Angola) were also much smaller than generally realized. It is estimated that about 3 000 men were involved in any external operations (Steenkamp 1989).
The SADF categorized external operations as:
• Pre-emptive Operations;
• Hot Pursuit Operations;
• Area Operations (Protection);
• Retaliation and Deterrence Operations; and
• Disruptive Operations.
With the signing of the New York Agreement in December 1988, the support for UNITA was restricted to humanitarian aid, verified by the SA Department of Foreign Affairs and the United Nations. Support to RENAMO was terminated with the signing of the Nkomati Accord in 1984. Contacts between South African officials and RENAMO after 1984 were aimed at convincing RENAMO to go for a political solution (Hamman2001, 107).
The Revolutionary Forces’s safe bases in the neighbouring countries posed a real threat to RSA’s security and stability. General Malan, the Minister of Defence, summed up the government’s view in this regard as follows: “… there is no controlled neutral zone between the RSA and the host countries…. The result is that the enemy is able to establish and operate its bases, arms depots and logistical routes close to the borders of the RSA, with the approval of the host country concerned. This means that the enemy can cross the border to lay landmines, kidnap and intimidate … and then within a few hours return to the host country, where he is unassailable. No government in the world can afford a situation of this nature. Consequently, when the situation arises, the SADF has no other option than to launch pre-emptive operations across the border in order to destroy bases, depots and logistical routes and in a way to discourage enemy action. Neighbouring countries must consequently realise that we have the right to act….. and we will do so...” (SANDF Nodal Point, 1997,1-13). Specific guidelines for cross border operations against enemy targets were formally adopted by the State Security Council, with subsequent approval by Cabinet, and were from time to time reviewed. The Minister of Defence and Chief of the SADF adhered to these guidelines. External operations were executed in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Lesotho (SANDF Nodal Point, 1997, 3-6). It is important to note that external operations could not be conducted without governmental (political) approval. (SANDF Nodal Point, 1997, 3-6).
In the early eighties the MK (ANC) realised that they could not succeed with a classical rural revolutionary war in South Africa. The bases in the neighbouring states were just too far from South Africa’s heartland to be effective. Therefore they decided to operate from inside the country. Mr. Mbeki, as a member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC, formulated the ANC’s position as follows: “We can’t fight a bush war in South Africa. We do not have forests. The military machine would smash us if we tried to send in an army from outlying areas. Our masses have to serve as our bush. The Black community is our bush” (SANDF Nodal Point 1997, 33). In 1985 an ANC conference at Kabwe, Zambia, decided that the distinction between “hard” and “soft” targets should disappear. This coincided with slogans like “make the country ungovernable” and “freedom before education” (Majola, 1986, 55; Umsebenzi, 1989). The result was that nearly 400 persons in South Africa were “necklaced” and another 370 died when persons or homes were doused with fuel and set alight. More than 7 000 private homes and 1700 schools were destroyed or severely damaged. In only one year (1985/1986) rioting caused damage of approximately R90 million. The role of the SADF changed dramatically - simply stated, particularly as perceived by the lower echelons of the SADF, it was a change from an offensive shooting war against an armed and normally identifiable enemy to the protection of lives and property and virtual peace keeping in a hostile environment concealing an unidentifiable enemy (SANDF Nodal Point, 1997, 3-36 ;).
In July 1985 the SA Government felt compelled to declare a state of emergency in terms of the Public Safety Act of 1953 in 36 magisterial districts and the security forces were given increased powers to deal with the situation (SANDF Nodal Point, 1995, 55). In July 1986 a national state if emergency was declared. This was extended annually until 1989. Mr P.W. Botha said it was the duty of the state to ensure that a stable and normal community life be re-established and that the situation be normalized in such a way that the climate for continued dialogue be ensured (SANDF Nodal point, 1995, 55). The Minister of Defence reiterated that the government was determined to ensure the RSA’s security. This resulted in a strategy based on support to the SA Police and on defensive and protective tasks. In short, the security forces (SA Police and SADF) had to maintain law in order to provide a timeframe for negotiations.
Because of the nature of the internal struggle and revolutionary strategy to make the country ungovernable, the SADF found itself increasingly involved in civic action-projects as part of the socio-psychological component of the conflict. In this regard the SADF deployed:
• medical doctors to provincial hospitals. Medical orderlies formed part of patrols and provided basic medical care;
• National Servicemen with educational qualifications to the Department of Education to help with education; and
• National Servicemen to the Department of Water Affairs to assist with projects in respect of water provision. In Natal up to 58 emergency water points were manned on a daily basis.
The following are examples of SADF operations in support of the SA Police (SANDF Nodal Point, 1995, 63-66):
• 1980 – 1993: Roadblocks;
• 1980 – 1993: Riot Control and Area Protection;
• 1980 – 1993: Protection of vulnerable areas and targets such as schools, school buses and industries;
• 1980 -1993: Curfews;
• 1981 –1993: Protection of National Key Points;
• 1985 –1993: Border Control;
• 1989: Safeguarding of the election on 6 September 1989;
• 1993: Protection at the World Trade Centre (CODESA); and
• 1994: Ensuring stability during the democratic elections in 1994.
SADF delivered ballot papers.
The SADF members were never trained to be policemen. The tasks allotted to the SADF were in accordance with its capabilities and limitations. The development of the revolutionary war impacted upon the SADF in the sense that the SADF had to adopt measures to deploy efficiently amongst the population. Because of the politically volatile situation on the one hand and the suitability/capability of the SADF on the other hand, the SADF was allotted the preventive/defensive type of tasks in operations. Although the SADF co-operated with all departments and other role players in joint planning and joint execution, the SADF troops served under their own commanders and accepted full responsibility for the execution of allotted operations or tasks. In the national management context each department acted in accordance with the mandate and budget of its department. The SADF observed this principle and never infringed on the terrain of the SAP or other departments in this regard (SANDF Nodal Point, 1995, 3-37).
7. PROPAGANDA, DISINFORMATION AND PERCEPTIONS
Propaganda, even disinformation, played a major role in the Cold War and subsequently the Revolutionary War (armed struggle) in Southern Africa. Andrew Christopher in his book on the KGB stated clearly that “the key to Soviet influence in Africa during the 1980’s remained the racist government in Pretoria” (Christopher, 1990, 530) According to the USA’s Department of State the aim of Soviet propaganda was to influence public opinion against South Africa. This entailed the dissemination of facts, arguments, half-truths or lies (USA Department of State, 1985, iii). Today we can laugh at some of the propaganda themes, but during the armed struggle they were real. For example, in 1988 it was alleged that the USA manufactured the AIDS virus in a US military facility at Fort Detrick, Maryland (Wick, 1988, 2).
In accordance with the ANC’s strategy, their propaganda was aimed at the “seizure of power” and to discredit the security forces. (Steenkamp, 1991,23; Radio Freedom) Therefore the SADF was the target for numerous propaganda campaigns. In the eighties it was alleged that South Africa has conducted wide-ranging research into chemical weapons “that affect only black-skinned people”. On 25 May 1984 it was added that this ethnic weapon could kill “an African, or Indian, a Chinese or Arab.” In the same report it was alleged that the SADF was testing the weapon on Namibians.” (Steenkamp, 1991, 23) In 1972 Andreas Shipanga, founder member of SWAPO, brought a TV crew to Namibia/Angola to see a village wiped out by the SADF. In his memoirs he acknowledges that this was one of SWAPO’s best scams, because it was the remains of the colonial war (Amstrong, 1989, 130-137).
The following are a selection of the perceptions still doing the rounds in South Africa today:
• Members of the SADF (and later the SANDF) do not support the process of Transformation and Reconciliation: On 30 August 1997, the Infantry Society hosted a Symposium on the SADF and Transformation. Serving and retired members of the force attended the Symposium. A motion adopted at its conclusion reads: The symposium express its unequivocal support for the process of reconciliation now taking place in South Africa and which must continue to take place. As in the past, we as former SADF members – shall continue to lend our full co-operation to the creation of a peaceful state for all its inhabitants. However, the symposium expresses its concern and dismay that over the unfair and apparently one-sided process by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Schalkwyk, 1997, 85);
• The SADF was the military arm of the Nationalist Party: The SADF, like the Union DF before it, never saw itself as the military arm of any political party. This is foreign to South Africa’s military culture and heritage. Since 1912, the UDF/SADF has served under numerous governments of differing persuasions, and, it is the military, more than the political parties, that has survived and continues to serve the country.
• The SADF defended Apartheid: The SADF never saw its role as maintaining or defending apartheid. The SADFsaw itself as being responsible for the defence of the country and its entire people and saw its role according to the military strategies of the time and in relation to the threat analyses, its responsibilities and its capabilities. More importantly, it was the SADF that warned the polical leaders that the solution to the conflict in South Africa was not to be sought through military means, but by political restitution. As early as 1981 the then Chief of the SADF reiterated in a briefing to the Cabinet it was incumbent on them to take the sting out of the revolution (SANDF Nodal Point, 1997, 1-23). General Malan, the then Minister of Defence, stated in parliament on 17 May 1981, “it is not the task of the South African Defence Force or Armscor to impose a specific political model for the country (Malan 1997, 12);
• The SADF was above the Law: At no stage was it the official policy of government that the SADF or its members were above the law (De Beer 2009). When Lieutenant-General Joffel van der Westhuizen was accused of ordering the murder of Goniwe and others, he was on trail in the high court in Port Elizabeth for almost one year (1992). During the amnesty process several policemen applied for amnesty for these murders. (De Beer, 2009) Furthermore, the military did not attempt a so-called “silent coup’ in order to play the predominant role. The members of the SADF clearly understood that the SADF could only be part of a solution, and not an end in itself. The SADF did not function in a vacuum, or of its own designs. It operated with adequate direction from the government and Parliament.
• The SADF managed a covert Third Force: There are constant allegations that the SADF was involved in the creation of a sinister and shadowy body, the so-called Third Force. Despite the persistent propaganda to the contrary, no Third Force ever existed. During 1985 the possibility was investigated to establish a Third Force (next to the SAP and the SADF) “which task would exclusively be to deal with unrest and counter revolutionary matters.” (Malan, 1997,51) The matter was discussed but never accepted or implemented. In the early nineties the phrase Third Force was once again created and ascribed to Military Intelligence Division (MID). The so-called Steyn Report further strengthened this perception. Lieutenant-General Steyn was appointed by the then State President, F.W de Klerk in November1992 to investigate the intelligence activities of the SADF (SANDF Nodal point 1997, 6-3; De beer 2009). Two days earlier Judge Goldstone (16 Nov 92) raided the offices of a MID covert collection office in Pretoria. He was of the opinion that he found the heart of the Third Force. In December 1992 Steyn briefed the State President and in the light of the negotiations with the ANC, Mr De Klerk decided to act decisively and gave instructions that 23 officers should be dismissed. Investigations by the SA Police and Attorney General of the Transvaal found “no evidence….. not even a shred that could be accepted in a court of law” (SANDF Nodal Point, 1997, 6-12 ; De Beer 2009). Several officers wrote a letter to the State President requesting a Court Martial to clarify the aspects, which they were being accused. This was not done and civil applications were instituted. The cases were settled out of court (De Beer 2009). Major-General Chris Thirion was not interested in money and requested a press statement by Mr de Klerk clearing his name and reputation. This was done.
• Koevoet was a part of the SADF. This perception is also incorrect. The former SA Police established Koevoet in 1979 and was not part of the SA Army. (SANDF Nodal Point, 1997, 6-3).
8. CONCLUSION:
In conclusion it needs to be stressed that the SADF was a professional, disciplined and well trained force. Those who served in the SADF were honorable and decent men and women. In the Additional Submission to the TRC the former Chiefs of the SADF took responsibility for the SADF actions and stated clearly that they “will in no way … load it on the shoulders of our subordinators where they carried out their tasks with discipline and in the execution of our instructions – and in the same way we will not follow the dishonorable path to pass all responsibility upwards to the politicians” (SANDF Nodal Point, 1997, 9). General Malan said in his submission to the TRC, “I respect them (SADF soldiers) and shall stand by them. I do not expect you to necessarily agree with all that was done by the SADF. Neither do I expect the family and friends of people who died in SADF operations to forget. My appeal to you and to them is only to accept the bona fides of the members of the SADF involved. I hold no brief to speak on behalf of MK, but I am prepared to accept that, as an organization, it also acted bona fide in the furtherance of its ideals.... We have to accept, that, irrespective of the methods used, both sides performed their duties, bona fide, in what they perceived to be service to their respective political masters.” (MALAN, 1997
The struggle claimed many lives on both sides of the struggle. On the SADF side, both Permanent Force members, as well as National Service Men, lost their lives. MK, APLA and SWAPO lost some of their best cadre’s and comrades. This created hate and division. Every life is valuable, and the loss of colleagues, family members, friends and comrades, are regretted. The actual experience of a soldier gives some insight into his psychological attitude. General Malan said in his submission to the TRC: “The emotions generated by contact with enemy fire, the loss of comrades and the shock of land-mine detonations negatively influence the judgment of the most reasonable and rational individual. War, in whatever form, has a degrading effect on most civilest of men. On the other hand, one experiences the apparently strange anomaly that, although opposing forces in war zealously strive to destroy each other, they, shortly after cessation of hostilities, exhibit an incomprehensive propensity to accept and forgive. This is precisely what has happened here in South Africa. Members of the SADF, MK and APLA shortly after the democratic elections worked shoulder to shoulder, as comrades-in arms, towards the success of the SA National Defence Force – the past forgotten” (Malan 1997). This originates solely from battle experience and a mutual understanding of the circumstances of conflict. Subsequently this characteristic assisted the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to establish a peacekeeping operational force in collaboration with other international organizations (United Nations) and militia (De Montfort, 2007).
• We salute the fallen in the Revolutionary War (armed struggle) in Southern Africa ! Let us remember them…
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Labels: SANDF; REFLECTION ON FACTS
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